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Dinah Rosenberg∗, Antoine Salomon† and Nicolas Vieille‡
December 15, 2010
Abstract
We focus on two-player, two-armed bandit games. We analyze the joint effect on the
informational spillovers between the players of the correlation between the risky arms, and
the extent to which one’s experimentation results are publicly disclosed. Our main results
only depend on whethert informational shocks bring good or bad news. In the latter case,
there is a sense in which the marginal value of these informational spillovers is zero.
Strategic experimentation issues are prevalent in most situations of social learning. In such
setups, an agent may learn useful information by experimenting himself, or possibly, by observ-
ing other agents. Typical applications include dynamic R&D (see e.g. Moscarini and Squin-
tani (2010), Malueg and Tsutsui (1997)), competition in an uncertain environment (MacLennan
(1984)), financial contracting (Bergemann and Hege (2005) ), etc. We refer to Bergemann and
Valimaki (2008) for a recent overview of these applications.
Consider two pharmaceutical firms pursuing research on two related molecules. This research
may eventually yield positive results, if the molecule or one of its derivatives turns out to have
the desired medical effect, or may never yield such results if this is not the case. In the light
of this uncertainty, how long should each firm be willing to wait in the absence of any positive
results ? The answer is likely to depend on the informational spillovers between the two firms,
on at least two grounds. On the one hand, the correlation between the two research outcomes
affects the statistical inferences of the firms. In the above instance, or in, e.g., the case of two
firms drilling nearby oil tracts, it is often natural to assume that these outcomes are positively
correlated. Klein and Rady (2010) discuss examples from economics of law, in which the relevant
outcomes are instead typically negatively correlated. On the other hand, the answer depends on
the extent to which research outcomes within one firm are observed by the other firm. There are
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cases in which research successes are immediately publicized (say, in the form of specific patents),
and other cases in which only research policy decisions are publicly observed.
Our purpose here is to study how these two dimensions – correlation and observability –
combine and influence the equilibrium outcomes. We use the continuous-time, game-theoretic
model of Poisson/exponential bandits, popularized by Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), and later
studied in Keller and Rady (2010), Klein and Rady (2010), Murto and Valimaki (2009) among
others. Each player is facing a two-arm bandit problem: at each time instant, each player has to
choose whether to stick to a risky arm, or to switch to a safe alternative. The risky arm may be
of a bad type, in which case it never delivers any payoff, or of a good type, in which case it starts
delivering payoffs at a random time. In contrast with most earlier work, we assume that the
decision to switch from the risky arm to the safe one is irreversible. This simplifying assumption
allows us to analyze and contrast two scenarios. In one of them, both past decisions and past
outcomes are publicly observed; in the second scenario, only past decisions are observed.
The basic strategic insights differ in the two scenarios. Indeed, when both actions and payoffs
are observed, there is no asymmetric information between the players, and our game of timing is
essentially a game of pure coordination: beyond a certain time, a player is willing to experiment
only to the extent that the other player still experiments. Accordingly, the formal analysis is
rather straightforward. The probability assigned by a player to his arm being good declines
continuously as long as no success occurs. If the two arms are positively correlated, a success hit
by the other player brings good news, and the absence of such a success is bad news, so that the
beliefs decline faster than in a one-player setup. If the arms are negatively correlated, such an
event instead bring bad news, and the belief held by the other player then jumps downwards.
When instead only actions are observed, the game does not exhibit clear strategic comple-
mentarities. In any time interval, a player deduces valuable information from the other player’s
behavior, only inasmuch as that player may choose to drop out in that time interval. There, an
event occurs when the other player drops, and this is evidence that he did not get any payoff from
the risky arm. The effect of correlation is reversed, when compared to the previous scenario. If
the two arms are positively correlated, such an event is bad news. A contrario, such an event is
good news if the two arms are negatively correlated.
Our main qualitative finding only hinges on whether events bring good or bad news. When
events bring good news,1 the belief threshold at which a player chooses to drop out is the same
as the belief threshold at which he would optimally choose to drop out, if he were alone. In
other words, the (marginal) option value of observing the other player is then equal to zero. In
a sense, equilibria thus exhibit no encouragement effect (see Bolton and Harris (1999)). When
events instead bring good news, symmetric equilibria always exhibit an encouragement effect,
1Thus, this is the case as soon as arms are negatively correlated and all information is public, or arms are
positively correlated, and only actions are publicly observed.
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and players keep experimenting with beliefs below the one-player threshold.2
The proofs for the two observation scenarios are fairly different. Yet, there is a common
intuition. If a player is indifferent between dropping out at times t and t + dt, then it must be
that the informational benefits derived from experimenting between t and t + dt just offset the
opportunity cost of doing so: thus, it might be that an event occurs, that will trigger him to
continue beyond t + dt. But if events bring bad news, an event coming from the other player
will increase that player’s desire to drop out. Thus, the trade-off faced at time t is the same as
if one were alone.
When payoffs (and actions) are observed, symmetric equilibria are all pure. If only actions are
observed, the unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed, with a continuous distribution, and the cdf
of the strategy is obtained as the solution to an linear, second-order differential equation. This
difference in equilibrium structure can be understood as follows. At a symmetric equilibrium,
there exists no date at which a player expects to ’learn something substantial’.3 Otherwise
indeed, the marginal value of the information obtained at that date would be positive, and this
player would rather wait and get this information, rather than, say, drop out shortly before
– this would contradict the equilibrium property. When payoffs are observed, a player ’learns
something’ from the other when this other player hits a success. This happens according to a
continuous distribution. When instead only actions are observed, player i ’learns something’ from
player j when player j drops out. Any atom in the strategy of player j corresponds to a date
at which player i’s belief will jump for sure – which cannot happen at a symmetric equilibrium,
as we argued. In a sense, the continuity of player j’s strategy ensures that the information flow
from player j to player i is continuous.
There is no asymmetric equilibrium outcome, unless when arms are negatively correlated
and past payoffs are not publicly observed. In that case, there is a flury of such equilibria, and
all of them weakly Pareto dominate the symmetric one. All asymmetric equilibria are purely
atomic, and the two players never drop out at the same time. Yet, all equilibria share our main
qualitative property: when dropping out, the belief held by a player is equal to the belief at
which he would drop out in a one-player setup.
Our paper is closely linked to the literature on strategic experimentation, as we indicated
above. In the Poisson/exponential setup, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), and Klein and Rady
(2010) assume that the two risky arms are perfectly correlated (positively in the former case,
and negatively in the latter) and analyze the case where payoffs are observed. However, agents
may freely switch between the two arms, and these papers are thus not directly comparable to
2In each of the four combinations but one, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
3Formally, there exists no date at which one’s belief jumps with probability one.
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ours. Keller and Rady (2010) study the case where the two risks are perfectly correlated and
payoffs observed, and relax the assumption that only a good risky arm may yield payoffs.
To our knowledge, existing work on the case with unobserved payoffs always assumes that the
decision to switch to the safe arm is irreversible. Under the assumption that arms are perfectly
(positively) correlated Rosenberg et al. (2007) provide qualitative results on the equibrium
structure. The present paper is more closely related to Murto and Valimaki (2009). Within a
discrete-time framework, they analyze the case in which actions are observed, and assume that
risky arms are positively correlated (so that events bring bad news). Their focus is on information
aggregation properties at equilibrium, especially in the limit as the number of players goes to
+∞. Yet, they argue that, at the symmetric equilibrium, in the continuous-time limit, a property
similar to our qualitative observation does hold.
The paper is organized as follows. We lay down the model in Section 1, and state our results
in Section 2. Section 3 contains proofs for the observed payoffs case, and an heuristic discussion
of the observed actions case. Detailed proofs are in the Appendix.
1 The model
1.1 Setup and comments
1.1.1 The setup
Time is continuous. Each of two players is facing a strategic experimentation problem, mod-
eled as a two-arm bandit problem. At each point in time, each player has to choose which of
two arms to pull. One of the arms does not involve any uncertainty, and yields a constant payoff
flow with present value s. The other arm’s type is ex ante unknown, and it may be either Good
or Bad. The decision to switch from the risky arm to the safe one is irreversible. That is, each
player has to choose when, if ever, to drop out and stop experimenting. We will throughout
denote by θi the time at which player i chooses to drop out.
A risky arm of type Bad (B) never yields any payoff. An arm of type Good (G) yields a
constant payoff flow with present value γ, starting from some random time τ , but no payoff prior
to τ . The random time τ follows an exponential distribution.
The players have the same prior q over the pair (R1, R2) of the types of the risky arms.
Conditional on the type profile (R1, R2), the two risky arms are independent. That is, in the
event where both arms are good, the two success times τ1 and τ2 associated with the risky arms
of the two players are independent random variables.
We focus on symmetric problems. That is, we assume that (i) the ex ante probability of one’s
arm being good is the same for both players, (ii) when good, both risky arms have the same
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characteristics (values of γ and λ) and (iii) players have the same discount rate, r > 0. We make
no assumption on the prior q beyond symmetry, and we measure correlation between the two
arms by ρ := q(R1 = R2 = G)− q(R1 = G)q(R2 = G). Thus, the two risky arms are positively
correlated if ρ > 0, and negatively correlated if ρ < 0.
There is a very simple formal setup fitting this description. LetX1 andX2 be two independent
random variables with an exponential distribution with parameter λ. Nature chooses the pair
(R1, R2) of risky types according to the common prior q ∈ ∆({G,B} × {G,B}). The time τi
at which player i’s risky arm starts delivering payoffs is τi := +∞ if Ri = B, and τi := Xi if
Ri = G.
We will analyze two variants of this model, which differ in the information made available
to the players along the play. In both variants, each player i knows at time t (i) his own past
payoffs, that is, whether τi < t or not, and (ii) player j’s past actions, that is, whether (and
when) player j already dropped out, or not. In one of the two variants, no additional information
is provided. In the other variant, player i observes moreover player j’s past payoffs – that is,
whether τj < min(θj , t) or not.
In the latter scenario, actions and payoffs are thus publicly disclosed. Since all information is
public, the players always share a common posterior belief over the two types. In this scenario,
the game exhibits clear strategic complementarities: the longer player j is willing to experiment,
the higher the option value of experimenting for player i and, therefore, the longer player i is
willing to experiment. We refer to this scenario, as the (observed) payoffs scenario.
In the former scenario, only the choices of player j are known to player i, and we refer to it
as the (observed) actions scenario. At time t, the inference made by player i is contingent on
player j’s strategy: over any time interval [t, t¯], the ’amount’ of information derived by player i
from player j depends on how likely it is that player j would drop out between t and t¯ in the
absence of a success.
In this scenario, there is no (low-dimensional) state variable. A complete description of a
player’s beliefs involves the infinite hierarchy of beliefs, and the information interaction is here
more complex. As a simple illustration, observe that the optimal payoff of player i is the same,
whether player j plans to drop out at time 0, or whether player j plans never to drop out, since
in both cases, player i infers no information whatsoever from observing player j. This suggests
that, in contrast to the payoffs scenario, player i’s optimal payoff is non-monotonic in the amount
of experimentation performed by player j.
1.1.2 The one-player benchmark P
One option available to player i is to ignore altogether the information coming from player
j. Thus, a natural benchmark is the decision problem P in which player i only observes his
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own payoffs. The problem P is a standard one-player decision problem . As long as τi ≥ t, the
probability assigned by player i to his risky arm being good, decreases continuously. The unique
optimal policy (see Presman (1990) or Presman and Sonin (1990) is to drop out as soon as this
belief reaches
p∗ :=
rs
λ(γ − s)
,
which happens (if no payoff is received) at the time Tp defined by P(Ri = G | τi ≥ Tp) = p∗. As
a function of his initial belief p ∈ (0, 1], the optimal payoff of the decision maker in P is given by
W (p) := gp+ (s− gp∗)
1− p
1− p∗
(
(1− p)p∗
p(1− p∗)
)r/λ
if p ≥ p∗ and W (p) = s if p < p∗,
where g =
∫ +∞
0
λe−λxe−rxγdx = γ
λ
r + λ
is the ex ante expected payoff of a good risky arm. To
avoid trivialities, we assume g > s > 0.
Thus, at equilibrium, no player ever drops out as long as he assigns a probability higher than
p∗ to his arm being good.
For future reference, we also define P˜ as the decision problem in which player i observes at
any time t whether τi < t and/or τj < t. Equivalently, P˜ is the best-reply problem faced by
player i in the payoffs scenario, when player j plans never to drop out.
1.1.3 Good vs. Bad News
The two cases of positive vs. negative correlation are qualitatively different. Consider first
the payoffs scenario. As long as players are active, and that no payoff is received, the probability
assigned to one’s arm being good decreases continuously. It decreases faster than in the bench-
mark P if ρ > 0, and slowlier if ρ < 0. Indeed, in the former case, (bad) news coming from the
other player constitute further statistical evidence that one’s arm is bad. When the first success
occurs, say at time τ1 < τ2, player 1’s arm reveals itself to be good, and player 2 updates his
belief.4 If ρ > 0, player 1’s success is good news, and player 2’s belief jumps upwards. If ρ < 0,
this is bad news, and player 2’s belief jumps downwards.
The statistical inferences in the actions variant are different. As long as both players are
active, and as time goes by, the fact that player j does not drop out becomes stronger evidence
that player j may have received a payoff from his risky arm. (However, the actual belief held by
player i depends upon player j’s strategy.) Player i’s belief decreases slowlier than in P if ρ > 0,
and faster if ρ < 0. If player j drops out, this provides conclusive evidence that τj ≥ θj . This is
4Throughout, and depending on the context, we use the word belief to denote either the posterior distribution
of the pair of types, or the posterior probability assigned to one’s arm being good. We hope that no confusion
will arise.
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good news for player i if ρ < 0, and bad news if ρ > 0: player i’s belief jumps upwards in the
former case, and downwards in the latter case.
Both scenarios thus lead to informational shocks. Whether these shocks are interpreted as
good or as bad news depends both on the sign of the correlation ρ, and on the informational
scenario. As we will see, our main conclusions are mostly driven by shocks bringing good or bad
news.
1.2 Strategies and outcomes
Since time is continuous, some care is needed when defining strategies. We adopt the view-
point that a strategy dictates when to stop, as a function of all available information. We argue
here that in most cases, the continuation game reduces to a one-player problem. This allows for
a straightforward definition of strategies, and of expected payoffs. We treat the two scenarios in
turn.
1.2.1 The payoffs scenario
Consider any time instant t, and let us focus on player i, who we assume is active prior to
time t. If τi < t, player i’s risky arm is known to be good, and player i should stick to it. On
the other hand, if either τj < t or θj < t, player j’s future behavior does not prove informative
to player i. That is, player i should update his belief at time min(τj , θj), and proceed with the
optimal policy in the one-player decision problem P. Hence, player i’s optimal decision at time t
is unambiguous unless if min(τi, τj , θj) ≥ t. Accordingly, we define a pure strategy of player i to
be a time ti ∈ [0,+∞], with the interpretation that player i drops out at time ti if player j has
not dropped out, and if no payoff has been received prior to t. A mixed strategy is a probability
distribution over [0,+∞].
We now explicit how to compute the expected payoff γiP (t1, t2) induced by an arbitrary pure
profile (t1, t2).
Assume first that t1 = t2 = t. The outcome of the game is determined as follows. In the event
where min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t, both players drop out at time t. If a success occurs prior to t, say at time
τ1 < min(τ2, t), player 2 updates his belief to ψ(τ1), where ψ(x) := P(R2 = G | R1 = G, τ2 ≥ x).
Player 2 then remains active until his belief reaches p∗, with an expected continuation payoff
equal to W (ψ(τ1)). Thus, when t1 = t2, the expected payoff of player i is
γiP (ti, tj) := γE
[
e−rτi1τi<min(τj ,ti)
]
+ E
[
e−rτjW (ψ(τj))1τj<min(τi,ti)
]
+ se−rtiP(min(τi, τj) ≥ ti)
(here and in the sequel, we use without further notice the fact that the probability that τ1 and
τ2 coincide and be finite is equal to zero: P(τ1 = τ2 < +∞) = 0).
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The expected payoff γiP (ti, tj) can alternatively be computed as follows. Conditional on
Ri = B, player i’s overall payoff is zero. Next, conditional on Ri = G, and Rj = B, player
i’s overall payoff is e−rτiγ, provided that τi < ti. The conditional expected payoff (given R
i =
G,Rj = B) is thus equal to A :=
∫ ti
0
λe−λxe−rxdx =
λ
r + λ
γ(1 − e−(r+λ)ti). Finally, conditional
on Ri = Rj = G, player i’s overall payoff is equal to e−rτiγ, provided that either τi < ti, or
that τj < ti and τi ∈ [ti, T ], where T solves ψ(T ) = p∗. The conditional expected payoff (given
Ri = Rj = G) is thus equal to
B :=
λ
r + λ
γ(1− e−(r+λ)ti) + (1− e−λti)γ
∫ T
ti
λe−λxe−rxdx.
Then, γiP (ti, tj) is equal to the weighted sum of A and B, using the prior q as weights.
Assume next that t1 < t2. In the event where min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t1, player 1 drops out at time t1,
and player 2 next waits until his belief reaches p∗. Player 2’s continuation payoff at time t1 is
given by W (φ(t1)), where φ(x) := P(R2 = G | τ1 ≥ x, τ2 ≥ x) is player 2’s belief at time x if no
success occurred prior to x. If instead min(τ1, τ2) < t1, the ’non-successful’ player updates his
belief at time min(τ1, τ2) to ψ(min(τ1, τ2)), and again, switches to the optimal policy in P, with
a continuation payoff equal to W (ψ(min(τ1, τ2)).
We stress that the outcome of the profile (t1, t2) does not depend on t2 as long as t2 > t1.
Observe also that player 1’s expected payoff does not depend on t2, as long as t2 ≥ t1. Thus,
γ1P (t1, t2) = γ
1
P (t1, t1), while
γ2P (t1, t2) = γE
[
e−rτ21τ2<min(τ1,t1)
]
+E
[
e−rτ1W (ψ(τ1))1τ1<min(τ2,t1)
]
+e−rt1W (φ(t1))P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t1).
1.2.2 The actions scenario
We now turn to the definition of strategies and to the computation of payoffs in the actions
scenario. Again, consider any time instant t ∈ R+, and let us focus on player i, who we assume
remained active prior to t. As above, if τi < t, player i’s arm is known to be good, and player i
therefore sticks to it. If now θj < t,
5 this is evidence that τj ≥ θj . At time θj , player i updates
his belief to φ(θj) (= P(Ri = G | min(τi, τj) ≥ θj)), stays alone and therefore remains active
until his belief reaches p∗. Hence, player i’s optimal decision at t is dictated by P, unless if
min(τi, θj) ≥ t. Here again, we thus let a pure strategy of player i be a time ti ∈ [0,+∞], with
the interpretation that player i drops out at ti if τi ≥ ti and θj ≥ ti. Again, a mixed strategy is
a probability distribution over [0,+∞].
Even though a pure strategy is the same mathematical object in the two scenarios, the
computation of expected payoffs is of course different. Consider an arbitrary pure profile (t1, t2).
5Recall that τj is not observed by player i.
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If t1 = t2, player i drops out at ti if τi ≥ ti, and stays forever if τi < ti. Player i’s expected
payoff γiA(t1, t2) is thus given by
γiA(t1, t2) := γE
[
e−rτi1τi<ti
]
.
Assume instead that t1 < t2. Player 1’s behavior is as we just described: he drops out at time t1
if τ1 ≥ t1, and stays forever otherwise. Hence, player 1’s payoff is given by
γ1A(t1, t2) = γE
[
e−rτ11τ1<t1
]
.
The payoff of player 2 is to be computed as follows. If player 1 drops out at time t1, player 2
updates his belief to φ(t1), and proceeds with the optimal policy in P. If player 1 does not drop
out at t1, player 2 either drops out at t2, or never, according to whether τ2 ≥ t2 or τ2 < t2.
Hence, player 2’s payoff is given by
γ2A(t1, t2) := e
−rt1W (φ(t1))P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t1) + γE
[
e−rτ2
(
1τ2<t1 + 1τ1<t1,τ2∈[t1,t2)
)]
.
As in the payoffs scenario, simple integral expressions for these payoffs will be used.
1.2.3 Conceptual issues
The definitions and interpretations of strategies raise a few conceptual issues. For concrete-
ness, let us focus on the actions scenario, and let a pure profile (t1, t2) be given, with t1 < t2.
According to the previous interpretation, player 2 chooses not to drop out at time t1. Assume
that the event θ1 = t1 < τ2 materializes.
6 Again according to our interpretation, player 1 drops
out at t1, player 2 then updates his belief to φ(t1), and switches to the optimal policy in P.
Depending on t1 and on ρ, it may well be that φ(t1) < p∗, in which case player 2 wishes to stop
as early as possible following t1 and even, possibly, to overturn his time t1’s decision. How then
should player 2’s decision at time t1 be defined ? Preventing player 2 to drop out at time t1 after
he has seen that player 1 has exited, would lead to spurious equilibrium non-existence results.
As a matter of fact, expected payoffs would not even be defined.7
To avoid this, we implicitly adopted the view that player 2 is allowed to revise his time
t1 decision, should player 1 decide to drop out. This leads to the informal idea that each
player has two decision nodes at each time instant t. At the first one, a player conditions his
decision on information available prior to t. Should he decide to remain active, and should some
informational event occur at time t, he is next allowed to revise his decision – that is, to drop
6Given the players’s strategies, this is the positive probability event where no payoff has been received prior
to t1.
7Similar issues arise in the payoffs scenario as well.
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out –, with no delay.8 We leave aside the technical issues involved in defining a game tree that
fits with these interpretations. However, the previous formulas for expected payoffs lead to a
well-defined game in strategic form, in which the space of pure strategies is R+ ∪ {+∞}.
We emphasize that a strategy only dictates when to stop. That is, the pure strategy t does
not specify when to stop, in the counterfactual event where one would not stop at time t when
required. This prevents us from discussing equilibrium refinements, and all of our results are
stated in terms of Nash equilibrium.
2 Results
As noted, our qualitative results hinge on the nature of informational shocks – whether they
bring good news or bad news. Consequently, we organize the discussion of our results around
this criterion.
Three belief functions, φ, ψ and ξ play an important role in the analysis. The first two have
already been introduced, and we here recall their definitions. The functions φ and ψ are defined
as
φ(t) := P(Ri = G | τi ≥ t, τj ≥ t) and ψ(t) := P(R
i = G | Rj = G, τi ≥ t).
Thus, φ(t) is the belief held by a player at time t conditional on no success occurring prior to t,
while ψ(t) is belief of player i if he knows player j’s arm to be good. Note that both φ and ψ
are continuous and decreasing.9
We also set p(t) := P(Ri = G | τi ≥ t). Note that ψ(t) > p(t) > φ(t) if ρ > 0, while
ψ(t) < p(t) < φ(t) if ρ < 0.
Given a player j’s strategy, the function ξi is defined as
ξi(t) := P(R
i = G | θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t).
We stress that ξi(t) depends on player j’s strategy, although this does not appear in the nota-
tion. In particular, the continuity and monotonicity properties of ξi are contingent on player j’s
strategy.
One can check that ξi is left-continuous, and has a right-limit at each t ∈ R+, which is given
by ξi(t+) = P(R
i = G | θj > t, τi > t). In addition, the map ξi is decreasing if ρ < 0, irrespective
of the strategy of player j.
8Obviously, one cannot merge these two nodes into a single decision node, at which each player would be
allowed to condition his time t-decision on the other player time t-decision. Indeed, circularity problems would
arise, leading to the indeterminacy of the outcome.
9Unless if risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated, in which case φ is constant. In what follows, we
sometimes implicitly assume that arms are not perfectly negatively correlated, but all of our results cover that
case as well.
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2.1 Negative informational shocks
We start by discussing here the case where events bring bad news. This is the case when
either (i) ρ < 0 in the payoffs scenario, or (ii) ρ > 0 in the actions scenario.
2.1.1 Main result
We let dates Tp, Tφ and Tψ be defined by
p(Tp) = p∗, φ(Tφ) = p∗ and ψ(Tψ) = p∗.
Theorem 1 (payoff scenario, ρ < 0) There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, (Tφ, Tφ).
Theorem 2 (actions scenario, ρ > 0) There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, (σ∗, σ∗). The
distribution σ∗ has a support
10 [Tp, Tψ], and a density, which is positive and continuous on [Tp, Tψ].
One has ξi(t) = p∗ for each t ∈ [Tp, Tψ].
The cdf of σ∗ is the unique solution of a linear differential equation, see Appendix.
The main conclusion to be drawn is that, at equilibrium, no player is willing to keep experi-
menting with a belief below p∗, the optimal cut-off in P. Put otherwise, while the informational
spill-over/externality clearly affects the speed at which beliefs change, the marginal option value
of observing the other player is equal to zero, when informational events bring bad news. Indeed,
when player i’s belief reaches p∗, he finds it optimal to exit, whether or not he may benefit from
observing the other player’s action/payoffs in the future.
While the equilibrium uniqueness claim in Theorems 1 and 2 is partly an artefact of the
symmetry requirement, this main conclusion holds at all asymmetric equilibria as well, as we
will see below.
There is a simple, yet very partial, intuition behind Theorems 1 and 2. Assume that, at some
time t ∈ R+, player i is considering whether to drop out at time t, or to wait an additional,
infinitesimal amount of time dt before dropping out. The rationale for waiting an additional dt is
that there is a chance that some event will occur that will cause a discontinuity in player i’s belief,
and trigger him to continue beyond t + dt. Such an event may either be one’s own success, or
an event coming from the observation of player j.11 In the latter case however, that event would
bring bad news, and would only reinforce player i’s desire to drop out. Hence, only the prospect
of hitting a success may justify to wait. But then, the condition of being indifferent between
exiting at time t or at time t + dt writes the same way, whether in the decision problem P or
when player i is observing player j. This sketch abstracts away from a number of complications,
and the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 differ significantly.
10That is, the smallest closed set in [0,+∞] that is assigned probability 1 by σ∗.
11That is, player j getting a payoff, or dropping out, depending on the scenario.
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2.1.2 Beyond the symmetry requirement
We here provide evidence that our main conclusion does not rely on our restriction to sym-
metric equilibria. We discuss first the payoffs scenario (with ρ < 0). Note first that φ(t) > p∗ for
t < Tφ, hence no player ever stops prior to Tφ at equilibrium. We will actually prove that the
unique optimal strategy in the decision problem12 P˜ is to exit at Tφ. This will imply that there
is a unique equilibrium outcome, in which each player drops out at Tφ in the absence of payoffs.
Proposition 1 (payoff scenario, ρ < 0) The equilibria are the profiles (Tφ, σ), where σ is any
distribution such that σ([Tφ,+∞]) = 1, together with the profiles obtained when exchanging the
two players.
Since the outcomes induced by (Tφ, Tφ) and (Tφ, σ) are the same whenever σ([Tφ,+∞]) = 1,
this multiplicity of equilibria is spurious.
In the actions scenario (with ρ > 0), we do not have a complete characterization of the set of
equilibria and, as Proposition 3 below shows, there may be countably many different equilibrium
outcomes. However, all the equilibria share the main qualitative feature of the symmetric one.
Proposition 2 (actions scenario, ρ > 0) Let (σ1, σ2) be an equilibrium, and let Si ⊆ R+ ∪
{+∞} denote the support of σi. One has ξi(t) = ξi(t+) = p∗ for each t ∈ Si (i = 1, 2).
Proposition 2 can be interpreted as follows. Consider any date t at which player i may
potentially drop out, according to his equilibrium strategy σi. Then, the belief held by player
i, whether computed before observing player j’s decision at date t (ξi(t)) or after observing it
(ξi(t+)) is equal to the one-player optimal threshold, p∗.
According to Proposition 3 below, for any k ∈ N, there is an (asymmetric) equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) in which each of the two strategies assigns positive probability to exactly k dates.
Proposition 3 (actions scenario, ρ > 0) For some specification of the parameters, the fol-
lowing statement is true. For every k ∈ N, there exist two sets U = {u1, . . . , uk} ⊂ R+ and
V = {v1, . . . , vk} ⊂ R+ and an equilibrium (σ1, σ2) such that
• Tp = u1 < v1 < · · · < uk < vk = Tψ;
• The supports of σ1 and σ2 are respectively equal to U and V.
We believe that the conclusion actually holds true for all parameter values, but leave this
outside of the scope of this paper.
12Recall that P˜ is the benchmark decision problem in which the decision maker observes, on top of his own
risky arm, whether the other risky arm produces any payoff.
12
2.2 Positive informational shocks
We now present our results for the case where events bring good news. This is the case when
either (i) ρ > 0 in the payoffs scenario or (ii) ρ < 0 in the actions scenario.
In the payoffs scenario, the game is a game of pure coordination. Player i is willing to
experiment beyond Tφ only to the extent that player j also experiments beyond Tφ. On the
other hand, no player will ever be willing to experiment beyond T∗∗, the (unique) optimal policy
in the decision problem P˜ .
As we will show in the Appendix, the optimal strategy in P˜ is T∗∗ = Tφ if ρ < 0. That is,
the optimal belief threshold in the decision problem P˜ is then the same as the optimal belief
threshold in P. This explains why there is a unique equilibrium in that case (see Theorem 1 in
the previous section).
When ρ > 0, one has T∗∗ > Tφ and, not surprisingly, a continuum of equilibrium outcomes.
Theorem 3 (payoff scenario, ρ > 0) One has T∗∗ > Tφ. All symmetric equilibria are pure,
and all pure equilibria are symmetric. The symmetric equilibria are the pairs (T, T ), with T ∈
[Tφ, T∗∗].
The asymmetric equilibria are the profiles (T∗∗, σ), where σ assigns probability 1 to [T∗∗,+∞]
(together with the profiles obtained when exchanging the two players).
Observe that in all equilibria (with the exception of the equilibrium (Tφ, Tφ)), players remain
active with beliefs below p∗.
Conclusions are much sharper in the actions scenario. We introduce the first-order, integro-
differential equation
W (φ(t))− s
λ(γ − s)
F ′(t) = (φ(t)− p∗)F (t) + λφ(t)(ψ(t)− p∗)
∫ t
0
eλ(t−x)F (x)dx. (1)
Standard results on differential equations imply that there is a unique function, which we denote
F∗, that solves (1) on the interval [Tp, Tφ), and such that F∗(t) = 0 for all t ≤ Tp.
Theorem 4 (actions scenario, ρ < 0) There is a unique equilibrium, which is a symmetric
and non-atomic equilibrium (σ, σ).
The support of the distribution σ is equal to the interval
[
Tp, Tˆ
]
, where Tˆ := min{t : F∗(t) =
1} < Tφ. The distribution σ has a positive and continuous density on its support, and its cdf is
equal to F∗ on the interval [Tp, Tφ].
Since ρ < 0, one has ξi(t) ≤ p(t) ≤ p∗, and the two inequalities are strict for t > Tp. That is, in
contrast with the case where ρ > 0, players remain active with beliefs below p∗.
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The proof of Theorem 4 is more delicate. We here discuss some rough intuition behind the
result. Beyond the fact that beliefs are strategy-contingent, there is one feature that distinguishes
the actions scenario from the payoffs scenario. Assume that player j uses the pure strategy t.
When facing this strategy, player i anticipates prior to t, that he will receive a piece of information
at t. This obviously creates an incentive for player i to wait until after t, when player j’s action
choice will become known. This rules out the existence of a pure symmetric equilibrium and,
more generally, severely limits the scope for equilibria involving atoms. The reason why equilibria
involving atoms fail to exist if ρ < 0, while many such equilibria exist if ρ > 0, is discussed at
length in Section 3. As a fact, the most intricate part of the proof of Theorem 4 consists in
showing that the cdf’s of equilibrium strategies are continuous.
Let us take this conclusion for granted, and let an equilibrium (σ1, σ2) be given, with con-
tinuous cdf’s. For concreteness, let us focus on player 1. Observe first that player 1 keeps being
more pessimistic with time, as long as τ1 ≥ t and θ2 ≥ t. This is the combined effect of two
factors. First, the fact that player 1 does not get any payoff is bad news in itself. Second, the
fact that player 2 does not drop out is an increasingly stronger indication that player 2 may have
received a payoff with the risky arm, which makes player 2 even more pessimistic since ρ < 0.
On the other hand, the event of player 2 exiting becomes lesser good news with time. Indeed,
if player 2 drops out at time t, player 1’s continuation payoff jumps to W (φ(t)), and that payoff
is decreasing with t.
Since, by the equilibrium condition, player 1 is indifferent between exiting or not at all times
in the support of σ, it must be that the chances of observing these good news increase with time.
That is, the hazard rate of the exit decision of player 2 should increase with time, in a way that
exactly offsets the two effects identified above. This condition writes as Equation (1).
This intuition suggests that the support and the density of σi are uniquely dictated by the
requirement that player j be indifferent between all times in the support of σj . It also suggests
why both strategies σ1 and σ2 must have the same, connected, support – hence the uniqueness
of the equilibrium.
3 Proofs
We find it more natural and convenient to present the payoffs scenario first. Most proofs in
that case are short and technically elementary, and we thus provide full details. The only one
exception is the analysis of the decision problem P˜, for which technical details are postponed to
the Appendix.
By contrast, all proofs in the actions scenario require technical care. Therefore, we will provide
detailed sketches here, and will refer the reader to the Appendix for the complete analysis.
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3.1 The payoffs scenario
The analysis of the payoffs scenario rests upon the analysis of the one-player decision problem
P˜, which we now provide.
3.1.1 The marginal value of observing the other player
We recall that a (pure) policy in P˜ is a time t ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞}, with the understanding that
the decision maker, say player 1, will choose (i) to drop out at t if min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t, (ii) to drop
out at t′ := min{x ≥ t : ψ(x) ≤ p∗} if both τ2 < t ≤ τ1 and τ1 ≥ t
′, and (iii) never to drop out
otherwise.
We will show in the Appendix that the decision problem P˜ admits a unique optimal policy,
T∗∗ < +∞. We denote by p∗∗ := φ(T∗∗) the belief held by the decision maker at time T∗∗, in the
event where min(τ1, τ2) ≥ T∗∗. (Plainly, one has p∗∗ ≤ p∗, the optimal threshold in P.)
Proposition 4 One has T∗∗ = Tφ if ρ < 0, and T∗∗ > Tφ if ρ > 0.
We here limit ourselves with an heuristic proof of Proposition 4. Let us place ourselves at time
t := T∗∗, and assume that min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t. By a dynamic programming principle, the decision
maker is indifferent between, on the one hand, dropping out at time t and, on the other hand,
staying in for an additional, short, amount of time dt, then behaving in an optimal way at time
t+ dt, in the light of the information acquired between t and t+ dt.
There are three events A, B and C to be considered at time t + dt:
A: player 1 hit a success in this additional amount of time (τ1 ∈ [t, t+ dt)),
B: player 2 hit a success but player 1 did not (τ2 ∈ [t, t + dt), τ1 ≥ t+ dt),
C: no one did.
As is usual for continuous-time dynamic programming, we write a first-order expansion of the
above indifference condition.
The (conditional) probability that A occurs is (approximately) λp∗∗dt. If event A occurs, the
decision maker’s overall continuation payoff, (discounted back to time t) is approximately equal
to γ.13
Observe next that the (conditional) probability that both arms yield a payoff between t
and t + dt is of the order of (dt)2, irrespective of the correlation between the two arms’ types.
Therefore, the (conditional) probability of B occurring, is approximately equal to the conditional
probability that τ2 ∈ [t, t + dt), which is λp∗∗dt. If the event B occurs, the flow payoff between
13This overall payoff depends on the exact time τ1. However, since it is multiplied by a probability which is
itself of the order of dt, only the leading term has to be kept.
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t and t+ dt is equal to zero, and the continuation payoff of the decision maker is approximately
W (ψ(t)).
Finally, the conditional probability that C occurs is the residual probability, 1− 2λp∗∗dt. On
the event C, the flow payoff is exactly 0, while the continuation payoff is exactly s, since the
decision maker then drops out at time t + dt. Hence on the event C, the overall payoff is equal
to e−rdts, when discounted back to t.
As a consequence, the first-order expansion of the indifference condition writes
s = λp∗∗γdt+ λp∗∗W (ψ(T∗∗))dt+ (1− rdt) (1− 2λp∗∗dt) s,
which simplifies into
λp∗∗γ + λp∗∗W (ψ(T∗∗))− (r + 2λp∗∗)s = 0. (2)
If ρ < 0, then ψ(T∗∗) < φ(T∗∗) ≤ φ(Tφ) = p∗, hence W (ψ(T∗∗)) = s. In that case, equation (2)
yields
p∗∗ =
rs
λ(γ − s)
= p∗,
and T∗∗ = Tφ as claimed.
If ρ > 0, one has ψ(Tφ) > φ(Tφ), hence W (ψ(Tφ)) > s, and Tφ is no longer a solution of
equation (2). Therefore, T∗∗ > Tφ.
Note that, according to equation (2), T∗∗ is a solution to the equation
φ(t) (γ +W (ψ(t))− 2s) =
rs
λ
. (3)
Since the left-hand side of equation (3) is the product of the positive and decreasing function φ
with a non-increasing function of t, the optimal time T∗∗ is uniquely determined by equation (3).
3.1.2 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 3
We here provide complete proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 for the payoffs scenario. We first
describe the best-reply correspondence of either player.
We denote by p˜i the payoff function in the decision problem P˜ . In the light of Section 1.2.1,
player i’s expected payoff γiP (ti, tj) is equal to p˜i(ti) as long as ti ≤ tj, and does not depend on ti
whenever ti > tj .
The continuity properties of γP (·, ·) on the diagonal t1 = t2 play a role in the analysis. We
fix t1 ∈ R
+, and we compare the outcomes induced by the profiles (t1, t1) and (t1, t2), where
t2 > t1. The two profiles yield the same outcome, except possibly if min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t1. On the
latter event, both players do exit at time t1 according to the profile (t1, t1). Instead, under the
profile (t1, t2), player 1 drops out at time t1, and player 2 remains active until his belief reaches
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p∗, with a continuation payoff equal to W (φ(t1)) ≥ s. Formally,
γ2P (t1, t2)− γ
2
P (t1, t1) = P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t1)e
−rt1 (W (φ(t1))− s) .
The continuation payoff W (φ(t1)) exceeds s if and only if φ(t1) > p∗, that is, iff t1 < Tφ. It
follows that γ2P (t1, t1) ≤ γ
2
P (t1, t2), and γ
2
P (t1, t1) < γ
2
P (t1, t2) if and only if t1 < Tφ.
This observation allows us to pin down the best reply correspondence. Fix first a pure strategy
t1 of player 1. The map t2 7→ γ
2
P (t1, t2) coincides with p˜i(·) on [0, t1], and is constant on (t1,+∞],
with γ2P (t1, t1+) ≥ γ
2
P (t1, t1), and γ
2
P (t1, t1+) > γ
2
P (t1, t1) if and only if t1 < Tφ. Since p˜i(·) is
single-peaked, with a maximum at T∗∗, it follows that the set B2(t1) of pure best replies to t1
is given by (i) B2(t1) = (t1,+∞] if t1 < Tφ, (ii) B2(t1) = [t1,+∞] if t1 ∈ [Tφ, T∗∗], and (iii)
B2(t1) = {T∗∗} if t1 > T∗∗.
In particular, if (t, t) is a pure symmetric equilibrium, then t ≥ Tφ by (i) and t ≤ T∗∗ by (ii),
hence t ∈ [Tφ, T∗∗]. Conversely, any profile (t, t) such that t ∈ [Tφ, T∗∗] is an equilibrium.
Much more precise conclusions are readily available. Observe that the pure strategy T∗∗ is a
best reply to any pure strategy of player 1 and, therefore, to any mixed strategy as well. Fix now
a mixed strategy σ1 of player 1, and let t2 ∈ [0,+∞] be arbitrary. Let us compare the outcomes
induced by the two profiles (σ1, t2) and (σ1, T∗∗). On the event min(τ1, τ2, θ1) < min(t2, T∗∗),
the two outcomes coincide. Assume instead that the event min(τ1, τ2, θ2) ≥ min(t2, T∗∗) occurs.
If t2 > T∗∗, it is strictly suboptimal to continue any longer beyond T∗∗, hence the expected
continuation payoff, conditional on min(τ1, τ2, θ1) ≥ T∗∗ is strictly higher under (σ1, T∗∗). Thus,
one has γ2P (σ1, t2) = γ
2
P (σ1, T∗∗) if and only if σ1((T∗∗,+∞]) = 0.
If now t2 < T∗∗, the only optimal policy is to continue until Player 1 drops. Thus, conditional
on min(τ1, τ2, θ1) ≥ t2, the expected continuation payoff of player 2 is strictly higher under
(σ1, T∗∗). In that case, γ
2
P (σ1, t2) = γ
2
P (σ1, T∗∗) if and only if σ1((t2,+∞]) = 0.
This allows us to characterize the set of all equilibria. Since γiP is not a continuous function,
a little care is needed. Let (σ1, σ2) be an equilibrium, and denote by Si the support of the
distribution σi. By the equilibrium property, one has γ
i(ti, σj) = γ
i(σi, σj) (= γ
i(T∗∗, σj)) for
σi-a.e. ti ∈ Si. Set ti = minSi and t¯i = maxSi. Note that ti ≥ Tφ for i = 1, 2.
Assume that, say, t1 < T∗∗.
14 Since t1 ∈ S1, there exist strategies t1 arbitrarily close to t1,
such that γ1(t1, σ2) = γ
1(T∗∗, σ2). By the previous paragraph, one has σ2((t1,+∞]) = 0 for any
such t1. This implies that t¯2 ≤ t1 and, a fortiori, t2 < T∗∗. This allows us to exchange the roles
of the two players in this argument. One then obtains t¯1 ≤ t2. Hence, t1 = t¯1 = t2 = t¯2: (σ1, σ2)
is a pure symmetric equilibrium.
Assume now that, say, t¯1 > T∗∗. The previous argument shows that t1, t2 ≥ T∗∗. Since t¯1 ∈ S1,
there exist strategies t1 > T∗∗ such that γ
1
P (t1, σ2) = γ
1
P (T∗∗, σ2). Therefore, σ2((T∗∗,+∞]) = 0.
14If ρ < 0, one has T∗∗ = Tφ, hence this situation cannot possibly arise.
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Hence, σ2 is the pure strategy T∗∗, while σ1 is concentrated on [T∗∗,+∞]. Conversely, any such
pair (σ1, σ2) is an equilibrium. This concludes the proof of Theorems 1 and 3, and of Proposition
1 as well.
3.2 The actions scenario
We here provide the main insights into the actions scenario, but we postpone all technical
details to the Appendix. While we remain at an informal level, we follow rather closely the
formal proof, for the reader’s convenience. In Section 3.2.1, we gather a number of observations,
which hold irrespective of the correlation. We will next discuss the cases of a positive and of a
negative correlation in turn.
We recall that a (pure) strategy of player i is a time t ∈ R+ ∪{+∞}, with the interpretation
that player i exits at time t if min(τi, θj) ≥ t, and otherwise behaves optimally from time
min(θj, τi) on.
For most of the section, we let a tentative equilibrium (σ1, σ2) be given, and we proceed using
necessary equilibrium conditions. Throughout, we denote by Si the support of the distribution
σi.
3.2.1 Atoms, beliefs and exit
We first discuss the impact on the exit decision of player i, of atoms in the distribution σj.
Recall that, when at time t, player i only knows whether player j dropped prior to t, that
is, whether θj < t. Whether player j drops out at time t will become known immediately after
t. As we argue in the Appendix, this implies that when facing σj , player i’s payoff function
t 7→ γiA(t, σj) is left-continuous, with a right-limit, γ
i
A(t+, σj) at each t. The belief function
t 7→ ξi(t) enjoys similar continuity properties.
If σj({t}) = 0, waiting an infinitesimal amount of time beyond t before possibly dropping
out, makes no difference : player i’s payoff function γiA(·, σj) is then continuous at t, and the
belief ξi(·) is continuous as well.
If instead there is a positive probability that player j drops out at t, (that is, if σj has an
atom at t), then waiting may make a difference. Indeed, if player j choose to drop out, the
continuation payoff of player i is then W (φ(t)) rather than s, had player j dropped out at t.
Formally, one has
γiA(t+, σj)− γ
i
A(t, σj) = P(τi ≥ t, θj = t) (W (φ(t))− s) . (4)
Note in particular that, whenever the payoff is discontinuous, it jumps upwards.
The right-continuity of the payoff function readily implies the observation O1 below.
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O1 If γiA(t+, σj) > γ
i
A(t, σj), then γ
i
A(t
′, σj) < γ
i
A(σi, σj) for every t
′ ≤ t close enough to t.
This observation formalizes the following intuition. Under the assumption in O1, the optimal
continuation payoff of player i15 at time t+ does depend on player 2’s decision at time t. And
since there is a positive probability that player j stops at t, the information gotten at time t has
a positive value. Then, when at time t′ ≤ t close to t, the continuation payoff of player i exceeds
s if he waits until told the decision of player j at time t, and then behaves optimally. Hence it
is suboptimal to exit at t′.
We next discuss the relation between the belief ξi(t) held by player i at time t, and his optimal
decision at time t.
We first formalize the intuition that, when this belief exceeds p∗, it it optimal not to drop out.
Assume that ξi(t+) > p∗. Thus, when at time t, and after hearing player j’s decision, player i
is optimistic – even if he were to be alone, he would find it optimal to experiment. Again, this
has a simple consequence. When at time t+,16 the continuation payoff of player i is higher than
s if he chooses to experiment for at least a short additional amount of time, and next to behave
optimally. This leads to our second observation.
O2 If ξi(t+) > p∗, then γ
i
A(t
′, σj) < γ
i
A(σi, σj) for every t
′ in a neighborhood of t.
We now discuss a bit more formally the extent to which player i should be willing to exper-
iment with beliefs below p∗. Assume that ξi(t) < p∗ for some t ∈ R+, and assume first that
the correlation ρ is positive. We claim that player i would rather drop shortly before t, rather
than wait until t. Let us indeed place ourselves at a time t′ < t very close to t, and assume
that player i is considering whether to experiment until t (but not until t+). Since ξi(t) < p∗, if
player i were not taking player j’s actions into account, waiting until t would yield an expected
continuation payoff below s. More precisely, the expected loss would be of the order of t− t′.17
Observing player j’s decisions in the time interval [t′, t] compensates to some extent for these
losses. However, the decisions of player j between t′ and t make a difference to the behavior of
player i only if player j happens to drop out in the time interval [t′, t). Given that ρ > 0, player i
then drops out immediately following player j, rather than waits until t. By dropping out earlier,
player i saves the cost of waiting, which is of the order of t− t′. However, the probability of that
event – the probability that player j drops out between t′ and t –, decreases to zero as t′ → t.
Thus, for t′ close enough to t, the marginal value of observing player j’s actions is arbitrary small
compared to t− t′ and therefore, small compared to the expected loss.
15conditional on τ1 ≥ t
16and conditional on player j being active
17The expected loss also depend on the difference p∗ − ξi(t). This difference is here kept fixed.
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We stress that this conclusion does not carry over to the case where the correlation ρ is
negative. Assume indeed now that ρ < 0. If player j drops out at some time x ∈ [t′, t), the
continuation payoff of player i is then equal to W (φ(x)). If φ(t) > p∗, the difference W (φ(x))− s
is bounded away from zero (for t′ close to t). Thus, if the probability that player j drops out in
the interval [t′, t) is itself of the order of t − t′, the marginal expected gain in observing player
j’s decisions is of the order of t− t′, and may well justify experimenting until t.
Nevertheless, there are still two cases in which the above conclusion remains valid. Firstly, if
φ(t) ≤ p∗, and since W ◦φ is a C
1 function, the difference W (φ(x))− s is at most of the order of
t− t′. Then, exactly as in the case where ρ > 0, the expected marginal gain of observing player
j is arbitrarily small compared to t− t′. Secondly, if the strategy σj is such that player j cannot
possibly stop in [t′, t), then the marginal value of observing player j is trivially zero.
This discussion is summarized in the two observations below.
O3 Assume that ξi(t) < p∗ and φ(t) ≤ p∗. Then γ
i
A(t, σj) < γ
i
A(σi, σj).
O4 Assume that ξi(t) < p∗ and that t /∈ Sj. Then γ
i
A(t, σj) < γ
i
A(σi, σj).
The previous observations O1 through O4 have useful immediate consequences, which are
valid irrespective of the sign of the correlation.
Claim 5 If t ∈ Si \ Sj, then ξi(t) = p∗.
That is, if player i finds it optimal to drop out at t /∈ Sj , the belief of player i at t is equal to p∗.
This claim follows immediately from O2 and O4, noting that ξi(·) and γ
i
A(·, σj) are continuous
at t since t /∈ Sj.
Claim 6 Assume that σj({t}) > 0. Then σi([t− ε, t]) = 0 for (every) ε > 0 small enough.
That is, if the strategy of player j has an atom at t, player i either stops well before t, or
after t. The proof of this claim combines the different observations.
If γiA(t+, σj) > γ
i
A(t, σj), the conclusion follows from O1. Assume now that γ
i
A(t+, σj) =
γiA(t, σj). In that case, one has φ(t) ≤ p∗ using (4), and ξi(t) 6= ξi(t+). Note that the belief
held by player i at time t+ is either equal to φ(t) if player j drops out, or to ξi(t+), if player j
does not drop out. Since the ’prior’ belief ξi(t) at time t is equal to the expectation of the belief
held at time t+ (this is the martingale property of beliefs), it must be that ξi(t) belongs to the
interval [φ(t), ξi(t+)]. This implies that either ξi(t) < p∗, or ξi(t+) > p∗. The conclusion will
follow using O3 in the former case, and from O2 in the latter.
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3.2.2 The case of good news
We here assume that the correlation between the two arms is negative. The observations
made in the previous section allow us to drastically reduce the range of potential equilibria, as
we now show.
Claim 7 Assume ρ < 0. Then Si = Sj and the common set is a compact interval of the form
[Tp, Tˆ ], where Tˆ is such that φ(Tˆ ) > p∗. Moreover, none of the two strategies σi and σj can
possibly have an atom in (Tp, Tˆ ], and at most one of the two has an atom at Tp.
The final assertion on the atoms follows immediately from the other assertions, using Claim
6.
Since ρ < 0, the belief ξi(t) is decreasing with time. We first argue, by means of contradiction,
that Si = Sj . Assume instead that t0 ∈ Si\Sj, for some t0 ∈ R+. ByO4, one thus has ξi(t0) = p∗,
and by O2, one has t0 = minSi. That is, player i cannot possibly stop prior to t0, so that the
belief held by player is ξj(t) = p(t) for every t < t0. Since the correlation between the two risky
arms is negative, one has p(t) ≤ ξi(t) for every t < t0 and therefore, ξj(t) > p∗ for every such t.
Hence, t0 < minSj by O2. This implies in turn that p(t0) = ξi(t0)(= p∗).
Next, set t1 := min{t > t0 : t ∈ Si ∪ Sj}. It is not difficult to combine the previous remarks
to show that t1 > t0 and t1 ∈ Si ∩ Sj so that t1 = minSj . Arguing as above, one then has
ξj(t) < ξi(t) = p(t) < p∗ for each t ∈ (t0, t1]. By Claim 6, one at least of the two strategies
σi and σj – say, σ2 –, assigns probability zero to t1. This implies that γ
1(t1, σ2) is equal to the
equilibrium payoff γ1(σ1, σ2), in contradiction with O4. This implies Si = Sj , as claimed. We
denote by S the common set.
Next, using both Claim 6, O2 and O3, it is easy to check that Tp = minS. If S failed to be
an interval, there would exist t0, t1 ∈ S, with Tp ≤ t0 < t1 and (t0, t1)∩S = ∅. We now essentially
repeat the previous paragraph. By Claim 6, there is a player, say j, such that σj({t1}) = 0,
which implies γiA(t1, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj), in contradiction with O4.
In order to complete the discussion of Theorem 4, we argue informally that there is at most
one equilibrium. (Existence is proven in the Appendix.) Let as above an equilibrium (σ1, σ2) be
given. Using Claim 7, we denote by [Tp, Tˆ ] the common support of the two distributions σ1 and
σ2. Wlog, we may further assume that σ2 is a non-atomic distribution. This implies that the
indifference condition γ1A(t, σ2) = γ
1
A(σ1, σ2) holds for each t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ]. We will first show that
this indifference condition uniquely pins down both the endpoint Tˆ and the distribution σ2. We
next claim that σ1 has to be equal to σ2, thereby establishing uniqueness.
We describe the distribution σ2 by its cdf, F2(t) = σ2([0, t]) = σ2([Tp, t]) (t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ]).
Note that F2(t) is also equal to P(θ2 ≤ t | R2 = B), and that the conditional probability
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F˜2(t) := P(θ2 ≤ t | R2 = G) is related to F2 through the identity
1− F˜2(t) = P(θ2 ≤ t,≤ τ2 | R2 = G) +P(θ2 ≤ τ2 ≤| R2 = G)
= e−λt(1− F2(t)) +
∫ t
0
λe−λt(1− F2(z))dz.
We place ourselves at some time t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ], and will write an expansion of the equality
γ1A(t+ dt, σ2) = γ
1
A(t, σ2), as dt→ 0. If either τ1 < t or θ2 < t, the outcomes induced by the two
profiles (t, σ2) and (t+dt, σ2) are the same. We henceforth condition on the event min(τ1, θ2) ≥ t.
Consider the three events A := {τ1 < t + dt}, B := {τ1 ≥ t + dt, θ2 ∈ [t, t + dt)}, and
C := {τ1 ≥ t + dt, θ2 ≥ t + dt}. (Conditional on min(τ1, θ2) ≥ t), the probability of A is of
the order of λξ1(t)dt, while the probability of B is P(θ2 ∈ [t, t + dt) | min(τ1, θ2) ≥ t). The
continuation payoff induced by (t + dt, σ2) as of time t, is approximately equal γ on the event
A, equal to W (φ(t)) on the event B, and is exactly equal to se−rdt on the event C, while the
continuation payoff induced by (t, σ2) is equal to s in all three cases.
Thus, the equality γ1A(t + dt, σ2) = γ
1
A(t, σ2) writes
(γ − s)λξ1(t) + (W (φ(t))− s)
P(θ2 ∈ [t, t + dt) | min(τ1, θ2) ≥ t)
dt
= rs.
This ’shows’ that the limit µ1(t) := limdt→0
P(θ2∈[t,t+dt)|min(τ1,θ2)≥t)
dt
is well-defined and solves
(γ − s)λξ1(t) + (W (φ(t))− s)µ1(t) = rs. (5)
The value of the limit µ1(t) may be interpreted as a conditional hazard rate for θ2, conditional
on τ1 ≥ t. Note that the probability P(τ1 ≥ t, θ2 ∈ [t, t + dt)) is given by
(
qGGe
−λt + qGB
)
(F˜2(t + dt)− F˜2(t)) +
(
qGBe
−λt + qBB
)
(F2(t+ dt)− F2(t)),
where qω1ω2 stands for the prior probability that R1 = ω1 and R2 = ω2). A similar formula holds
for P(τ1 ≥ t, θ2 ≥ t). Letting dt → 0 and plugging into (5), standard algebraic manipulations
then show that F2 solves the integro-differential equation (1) on the interval [Tp, Tˆ ].
Since σ2 is concentrated on [Tp, Tˆ ], one has moreover F2(Tp) = 0 and
∫ Tp
0
e−λx(1 − F (x)) =
1− e−λTp
λ
. There is a unique solution, say Fˆ2, to the equation (1) on [Tp, Tφ], that satisfies these
initial conditions. Therefore, it must be that Tˆ := min{t : Fˆ2(t) = 1}, and F2 coincides with Fˆ2
on the interval [Tp, Tˆ ]. This shows the uniqueness of Tˆ and of F2, as desired.
We turn to the strategy σ1. Since σ1 has no atom in the interval (Tp, Tˆ ], one has γ
2
A(t, σ1) =
γ2A(t
′, σ1) for every t, t
′ ∈ (Tp, Tˆ ], so that the hazard rate µ2 of player 1’s exit decision is related
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to player 2’s belief ξ2 through the equation (5), for every t ∈ (Tp, Tˆ ]. The economic intuition
behind the uniqueness claim is as follows.
Assume for a moment that σ1 has an atom located at Tp: σ1({Tp} > 0. Then, when at time
Tp+ (if player 1 remains active), player 2 is more pessimistic than player 1: ξ2(Tp+) < ξ1(Tp+).
Since both players 1 and 2 are indifferent between dropping out immediately, and waiting a
further infinitesimal amount of time, it must be that player 2 assigns higher chances than player
1 does, to the fact that he will receive good news in this time interval. In other words, the
probability of player 1 dropping out should be higher than the probability of player 2 dropping
out, to compensate for the fact that player 2 is more pessimistic. Indeed, from (5), one has
µ2(t) > µ1(t) as soon as ξ1(t) > ξ2(t). Should players remain active, this will make player 2
even more pessimistic than player 1. Proceeding ”inductively”, one obtains more generally that
F1(t) > F2(t) for all t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ] and therefore, F1(t) = 1 for some t < Tˆ – in contradiction with
the fact that σ1 and σ2 have the same support.
3.2.3 The case of bad news
We now turn to the case where the correlation between the two risky arms is positive. Again,
we derive direct implications of the observations O1-4 and of Claims 5 and 6.
We first check that the main qualitative insight is valid (Proposition 2). Let (σ1, σ2) be an
equilibrium and assume by way of contradiction that ξi(t) < p∗ for some t ∈ Si. Since ρ > 0,
the two beliefs φ(t) and ξi(t) satisfy φ(t) ≤ ξi(t). Using (4), this yields γ
i
A(t+, σj) = γ
i
A(t, σj).
This implies in turn that the payoff γiA(t, σj) induced by the strategy t must be equal to the
equilibrium payoff γiA(σi, σj), in contradiction with O3. Thus, whenever player i is willing to
drop out, his belief ξi is equal to the one-player threshold, p∗.
Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium
Let (σ, σ) be a symmetric equilibrium, with support S. Using Claim 6, the distribution σ
is necessarily non-atomic. By the Proposition 2 just proven, one must have ξi(t) = p∗ for each
t ∈ S. The only way for a player’s belief to remain constant over time is when the bad news
coming from one’s own arm is exactly offset by the good news coming from the other player, at
any point in time. This suggests that the support S of σ must be an interval, say [T1, T2].
Note now that ξi(T1) = p(T1): indeed, since player j never stops prior to T1, the event θj ≥ T1
is uninformative. On the other hand, player j stops for sure before T2, unless he has hit a success:
thus, ξi(T2) = ψ(T2). Since ξi(T1) = ξi(T2) = p∗, T1 and T2 must therefore be equal to Tp and Tψ
respectively. Finally, the distribution σ is uniquely defined by the condition that ξi(t) = p∗ for
each t ∈ [Tp, Tψ). While this establishes uniqueness, this does not prove existence of a symmetric
equilibrium. The existence proof is common to the case where ρ < 0, and is postponed to the
Appendix.
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Pure equilibria
In contrast with the case where ρ > 0, there may be many equilibria with finite support, as
stated in Proposition 3. Let first (t1, t2) be a tentative pure equilibrium. By Claim 6, one has
t1 6= t2. Assume wlog that t1 < t2. As above, one then has ξ1(t1) = p(t1) and ξ2(t2) = ψ(t2) and
therefore, t1 = Tp and t2 = Tψ. We now argue that (Tp, Tψ) is indeed a pure equilibrium.
When facing Tp, the payoff function t 7→ γ
2
A(t, σ1) of player 2 is increasing over [0, Tψ] since
ξ2(t+) > p∗ for every t < Tψ, and decreasing beyond Tψ, with a discontinuity at Tp. Therefore,
Tψ is the unique best reply of player 2 to Tp.
When facing Tψ, and for t ≤ Tψ, the payoff of player 1 is the same as in the decision problem
P, since player 1 does not deduce any information from the behavior of player 2 up to time t.
This payoff is therefore increasing over [0, Tp], and decreasing on [Tp, Tψ]. Should player 1 choose
to wait beyond Tψ, and to learn the decision of player 2 at time Tψ, his belief would then jump
either to φ(Tψ) or to ψ(Tψ), depending on that decision. But since φ(Tψ) < ψ(Tψ) = p∗, player
1 will then find it optimal to drop out anyway. Hence Tp is the unique best reply to the strategy
Tψ.
Aymmetric equilibria
The proof that equilibria may exist with a finite support of arbitrary size is a bit delicate
and we briefly discuss the main ideas. Let a tentative equilibrium (σ1, σ2) be given, where σi
assigns positive probability to exactly k dates. By Claim 6, the two equilibrium supports S1 and
S2 are disjoint. Since ξi(ti) = p∗, it must be that the two sets S1 and S2 are interlaced : any
two consecutive dates in Si are separated by exactly one date in Sj. The equilibrium logic is
as follows. If player i does not drop out at some ti ∈ Si, this is good news for player j, whose
belief jumps above p∗, and then declines continuously until it reaches p∗ at the next date tj in
Sj . Meanwhile, player i’s belief declines below p∗ until date tj . If player j does not drop out at
that date, player i’ s belief jumps above p∗, and then declines continuously until it reaches p∗ at
the next date in Si. And so on.
We illustrate the proof in the specific case where k = 2, and Si = {ti, t¯i}. Assuming wlog
t1 < t2, the same arguments as above imply t1 = Tp and t¯2 = Tψ. We are thus left with four
unknowns – t2 and t¯1, and the weight assigned by σi to ti–, and four equilibrium conditions:
the belief conditions ξ1(t¯1) = ξ2(t2) = p∗ and the indifference condition for player i at time ti.
Existence is proven using a fixed point argument in the convex and compact set of pairs (t2, t¯1)
such that Tp ≤ t2 ≤ t¯1 ≤ Tψ. In a nutshell, the proof goes as follows. Given t¯1 ∈ [Tp, Tψ],
we prove that there is a unique t2 ∈ [Tp, t¯1] and a unique weight on t2 such that (i) the belief
held by player 1 at t¯1 is equal to t∗ and (ii) the payoffs induced by the two strategies Tp and t¯1
are the same. Moreover, t2 is continuous w.r.t. t¯1 and t2 ∈ (Tp, t¯1) whenever t¯1 > Tp. Using a
similar argument, we prove that for given t2, there is a unique t¯1 ∈ [t2, Tψ] and a unique weight
on t1 = Tp such that (i) the belief of player 2 at t2 is p∗ and (ii) the payoffs induced by the two
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strategies t2 and Tψ are the same.
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Appendix
We here provide all the formal details. We start with the analysis of the decision problem P˜
In Section A, and next complete the analysis of the payoffs scenario. The much longer section B
contains the analysis of the actions scenario.
A The decision problem P˜
We adopt the convention that the decision maker in P˜ is player 2. We recall that the expected
payoff induced in P˜ by the pure strategy t is denoted by p˜i(t), and is given by
p˜i(t) = E
[
e−rτ1W (ψ(τ1))1τ1≤min(τ2,t)
]
+γE
[
e−rτ21τ2<min(τ1,t)
]
+se−rtP(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t), for t ∈ R+.
Thus, for every two dates t < t′, one has
p˜i(t′)− p˜i(t) = E
[
e−rτ1W (ψ(τ1))1t≤τ1<min(τ2,t′)
]
+ γE
[
e−rτ21t≤τ2<min(τ1,t′)
]
(6)
+s
(
e−rt
′
P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t
′)− e−rtP(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t)
)
. (7)
We will prove that there is a unique optimal strategy, T∗∗, which is obtained as the unique
solution to the equation
λφ(T∗∗) (W (ψ(T∗∗) + γ − 2s) = rs.
In addition, T∗∗ ≥ Tφ, and T∗∗ > Tφ if and only if ρ > 0.
The proof is organized in several steps.
Claim 8 There exists an optimal strategy.
Proof of the claim. By dominated convergence, p˜i is continuous over R+, and has a limit
when t→ +∞, which we denote p˜i(+∞). Letting t′ → +∞ in (6), one gets
p˜i(+∞)− p˜i(t) = E
[
e−rτ1W (ψ(τ1))1t≤τ1<τ2
]
+ γE
[
e−rτ21t≤τ2<τ1
]
− se−rtP(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t). (8)
The first expectation in the right-hand side of (8) is at most γe−rtP(t ≤ τ1 < +∞), while the
second one is at most γe−rtP(t ≤ τ2 < +∞). The probabilities P(t ≤ τ1 < +∞) = P(t ≤
τ2 < +∞) converge to zero as t → +∞, while P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t) has a positive limit. Thus,
p˜i(+∞) < p˜i(t) for every large t. It follows that p˜i admits (at least) one maximum.
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Claim 9 The function p˜i is of class C1 and its derivative is given by
p˜i′(t) = e−rtP(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t)× {λφ(t) (W (ψ(t)) + γ − 2s)− rs} , t ∈ R+. (9)
Proof. Fix t0 ∈ R+. We will prove the claim relative to the right-derivative. Similar
arguments apply for the existence of a left derivative.
Observe first that, for t > t0,
P(τ1, τ2 ∈ [t0, t]) ≤ P(τ1, τ2 ∈ [t0, t] | R1 = R2 = G)
= e−2λt
(
1− e−λ(t−t0)
)2
≤ λ2(t− t0)
2.
Therefore,
lim
tցt0
P(τ1, τ2 ∈ [t0, t])
t− t0
= 0. (10)
Thus, when taking the limit of
p˜i(t)− p˜i(t0)
t− t0
(see (6)), the indicators 1t0≤τ1<min(τ2,t) and
1t0≤τ2<min(τ1,t) which appear in the first two expectations can be replaced with 1t0≤τ1<t and 1t0≤τ2<t
respectively.
Next, consider each of the (simplified) two expectations in turn (divided by P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥
t0)). Observe first that
1
t− t0
E
[
e−r(τ1−t0)W (ψ(τ1))1τ1∈[t0,t) | min(τ1, τ2 ≥ t0)
]
= φ(t0)
1
t− t0
∫ t
t0
e−r(x−t0)W (ψ(x))λe−λ(x−t0)dx,
which converges to λφ(t0)W (ψ(t0)) when tց t0, since W (·) and ψ(·) are continuous.
Observe next that
1
t− t0
E
[
e−r(τ2−t01τ2∈[t0,t) | min(τ1, τ2 ≥ t0
]
converges to λφ(t0), for similar
reasons.
We finally deal with the last term in the expression of p˜i(t)− p˜i(t0) in (6). One has
1
P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0)
×
1
t− t0
(
e−r(t−t0)P (min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t)−P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0)
)
=
1
t− t0
(
e−r(t−t0)P(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t | min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0)− 1
)
=
1
t− t0
(
(e−r(t−t0) − 1)P (min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t | min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0)−P (min(τ1, τ2) < t | min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0)
)
.
The first term converges to −r. Using (10), the second term has the same limit, namely −2λφ(t0),
as the expression
− (P(τ1 ∈ [t0, t) | min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0) +P(τ2 ∈ [t0, t) | min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t0)) .
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The result follows when adding these different limits.
We now conclude the proof of Proposition 1. Let T∗∗ ∈ R+ be any point at which p˜i reaches
its maximum. One has p˜i′(T∗∗) = 0, that is
λφ(T∗∗)W (ψ(T∗∗)) + λφ(T∗∗)γ − s(r + 2λφ(T∗∗)) = 0
or equivalently,
λφ(T∗∗) (W (ψ(T∗∗) + γ − 2s) = rs. (11)
Since φ is decreasing, positive and continuous, and since W (ψ(·)) is non-increasing, Equation
(11) has a unique solution.
Recall now that Tφ solves
λφ(Tφ)(γ − s) = rs.
Since W (ψ(T∗∗)) ≥ s, this implies φ(T∗∗) ≤ φ(Tφ), hence T∗∗ ≥ Tφ.
If ρ < 0, one has ψ(T∗∗) ≤ φ(T∗∗) ≤ φ(Tφ) = p∗, hence W (ψ(T∗∗)) = s, so that Equation (3)
reduces in that case to λφ(T∗∗)(γ − s) = rs, and T∗∗ = Tφ.
If instead ρ > 0, then ψ(T∗) > φ(Tφ), hence W (ψ(Tφ)) > s, so that Tφ is not a solution to
(11). In that case, one therefore has T∗∗ > Tφ.
B The actions scenario
In this section, we provide the proofs of all the results relative to the actions scenario. The
section is organized as follows. We first introduce in Section B.1 some notation and prove a few
properties, which are valid irrespective of the sign of the correlation. Next, we prove that the
marginal value of the informational externality is zero when ρ > 0 (Proposition 1 in the paper),
and characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in that case (Theorem 1 in the paper). We
then prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium when ρ < 0 (Theorem 4 in the
paper), and provide a characterization of the equilibrium. Finally, we come back to the case of
a positive correlation, and prove the multiplicity of asymmetric equilibria (Proposition 2 in the
paper).
B.1 Technical Preliminaries
We let a strategy σj of player j be fixed throughout this section. Recall that the belief
function ξi is defined by ξi(t) = P(R
i = G | τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t) (t ∈ R+), which is computed under
the assumption that player j is using the strategy σj . It is readily checked that ξi(·) is left-
continuous over R+, and has a right-limit at each t ∈ R+, which is given by ξi(t+) := P(R
i =
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G | τi > t, θj > t). In addition, ξi is continuous at t ∈ R+ if and only if P(θj = t) = 0 that is, if
and only if σj({t}) = 0.
B.1.1 Expected Payoffs
This section serves as a reminder for some notation, and provides a few elementary properties
of the payoff function γA.
When facing the strategy σj , and when using the strategy t, the continuation payoff of player
i at time min(t, τi, θj) is equal to (i) s if θj ≥ t and τi ≥ t, (ii) γ if τi ≤ θj and τi < t, and (iii)
W (φ(θj)) if θj < min(t, τi).
Since τi has a density conditional on Ri = G, one has P(τi = θj < +∞) = 0, and player i’s
expected payoff under (t, σj) is thus given by
γiA(t, σj) = se
−rtP(θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t) + γE
[
e−rτi1τi<min(θj ,t)
]
+ E
[
e−rθjW (φ(θj))1θj<min(τi,t)
]
.
In particular, for t0 < t, one has
γiA(t, σj)− γ
i
A(t0, σj) = se
−rtP(θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t)− se
−rt0P(θj ≥ t0, τi ≥ t0) (12)
+γE
[
e−rτi1t0≤τi<min(θj ,t)
]
+ E
[
e−rθjW (φ(θj))1t0≤θj<min(τi,t)
]
. (13)
By dominated convergence, the map t 7→ γiA(t, σj) is left-continuous over R+, and admits a
right-limit at each t ∈ R+, which we denote γ
i
A(t+, σj), and which is given by
γiA(t+, σj)− γ
i
A(t, σj) = e
−rtP(θj = t, τi ≥ t)× (W (φ(t))− s) . (14)
Since W (p) ≥ s for each p ∈ [0, 1], this implies that γiA(t+, σj) ≥ γ
i
A(t, σj), and that equality
holds when either σj({t}) = 0, or φ(t) ≤ p∗.
If σi is a best reply of player i to σj , then γ
i
A(t, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj) for σi-a.e. t ∈ [0,+∞]. In
particular, for a given t ∈ R+, one has γ
i
A(t, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj) whenever σj({t}) = 0, and t belongs
to the support of σi. We will also rely on the following fact.
Fact 0. For every t in the support of σi, one has γ
i
A(t+, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj).
Indeed, note that any such t is a limit of a sequence (tn) such that
18 γiA(tn, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj).
Note next that lim supn→+∞ γ
i
A(tn, σj) ≤ γ
i
A(t+, σj) for any sequence tn → t. This yields Fact
0.
It will be convenient to study and characterize equilibria by means of the differential properties
18Otherwise indeed, one would have γiA(x, σj) < γ
i
A(σi, σj) for all x in some neighborhood of t, and player i
would be better off assigning probability zero to that neighborhood.
30
of t 7→ γiA(t, σ
j). We here gather a few simple observations, to which we will repeatedly refer
later. All these observations are valid, irrespective of the strategy σj .
We let x > 0 be given, and will let y > x vary.19
Since τi follows an exponential distribution if Ri = G, one has:
Fact 1. limyցx
1
y−x
P(τi < y | min(θj , τi) ≥ x) = λξi(x).
Since P(θj ∈ (x, y)) converges to zero as y → x, and since θj and τi are conditionally
independent given the types (Ri, Rj), Fact 1 implies that
lim
yցx
1
y − x
P(x < θj , τi ≤ y) = 0. (15)
Next, observe that e−r(y−x)P(min(θj , τi) ≥ y | min(θj , τi) ≥ x)− 1 is equal to
(e−r(y−x) − 1)P(min(θj , τi) ≥ y | min(θj , τi) ≥ x)−P(min(θj , τi) < y | min(θj , τi) ≥ x).
Combining (15) with Fact 1, this easily yields Fact 2 below.
Fact 2. The sum of
1
y − x
(
e−r(y−x)P(min(θj , τi) ≥ y | min(θj , τj) ≥ x)− 1
)
and of
1
y − x
P(θj <
y | min(θj , τj) ≥ x) converges to r + λξ
i(x) as y ց x.
Let β(·) be a C1 function of time. For y > x close to x, the difference supt∈[x,y] |β(t)− β(x)|
is at most of the order of (y − x)β ′(x). Since limy→xP(θj ∈ (x, y)) = 0, and together with the
previous fact, this implies Fact 3 below.
Fact 3. Let β be a C1 function. The difference between
1
y − x
E[β(θj)1θj<min(y,τi) | min(τi, θj) ≥
x] and
1
y − x
β(x)P(θj < y | min(τi, θj) ≥ x) converges to zero as y → x.
For similar reasons, one has Fact 3b below.
Fact 3b. Let β be a C1 function. The difference between
1
y − x
E[β(τi)1τi<min(y,θj) | min(τi, θj) ≥
x] and
1
y − x
E[β(τi)1τi<y | min(τi, θj) ≥ x) converges to zero as y ց x. In addition,
limyցx
1
y−x
E[β(τi)1τi<min(y,θj) | min(τi, θj) ≥ x] = λξi(x)β(x).
19We assume without further notice that P(θj > x) > 0.
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B.1.2 The actions game and the decision problem P
We here discuss the relation between optimal policies in P, and monotonicity properties of
the map t 7→ γiA(t, σj). Let first I be an interval that is assigned probability zero by σj . Then,
while in the time interval I, player i is ’alone’ and the comparison between two policies t and t
in I is driven by the map W . Formally, let t0, t, t ∈ I be such that t0 < t < t. By (12), one has
γiA(t, σj)− γ
i
A(t, σj)
e−rtP(τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t0)
= se−r(t−t)P (τi ≥ t | τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t0)+γE
[
e−r(τi−t)1τi<t | τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t0
]
−s.
(16)
The right-hand side of equation (16) is equal to the payoff induced in the decision problem P by
the policy t− t, when starting with a belief equal to ξi(t). This immediately implies the following
fact.
Fact 4. Under the above assumptions, one has γiA(t, σj) < γ
i
A(t, σj) if ξi(t) < p∗, and γ
i
A(t, σj) >
γiA(t, σj) if ξi(t) > p∗.
20
Our next observation has a straightforward intuition, but the formal proof requires a few
details.
Fact 5. Assume that ξi(t0+) > p∗. Then γ
i
A(t, σj) > γ
i
A(t0, σj) for all t > t0 close enough to t0.
The intuition is as follows. We place ourselves at time t0, in the event where τi ≥ t0 and
θj ≥ t0. Player i may choose to exit (strategy t0), and thereby to get a continuation payoff
equal to s. Or he may choose to wait for player j’s decision, and then play optimally. Since
ξi(t0+) > p∗, the latter choice yields a higher payoff.
The formal proof goes as follows. Since ξi(t0+) > p∗, the derivative of the mapW (·), evaluated
at ξi(t0+), is positive. We will prove that
lim inf
tցt0
γiA(t, σj)− γ
i
A(t0, σj)
t− t0
≥ e−rt0W ′(ξi(t0+))P(τi ≥ t0, θj > t0),
which yields the result.
Since W (φ(x)) ≥ s for every x ≥ t0, one has using (12),
γiA(t, σj)− γ
i
A(t0, σj) ≥ se
−rtP (τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t)− se
−rt0P (τi ≥ t0, θj ≥ t0)
+sE
[
e−rθj1t0≤θj<min(τi,t)
]
+ γE
[
e−rτi1t0≤τi<min(θj ,t)
]
.
20Note that the condition is set on ξi(t) in the first case, and on ξi(t) in the second case.
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When moving the event θj = t0 from the third to the second term, and using the fact that τi has
a density, one obtains
γiA(t, σj)− γ
i
A(t0, σj) ≥ se
−rtP(τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t)− se
−rt0P(τi ≥ t0, θj > t0) (17)
+sE
[
e−rθj1t0<θj<min(τi,t)
]
+ γE
[
e−rτi1t0≤τi<min(θj ,t)
]
. (18)
≥ se−rtP(τi ≥ t, θj > t0)− se
−rt0P(τi ≥ t0, θj > t0) + γE
[
e−rτi1t0≤τi<min(θj ,t)
]
(19)
Using Fact 3b, this implies that
1
e−rt0P(τi ≥ t0, θj > t0)
lim inf
tցt0
γiA(t, σj)− γ
i
A(t0, σj)
t− t0
is at
least equal to
lim
tցt0
1
t− t0
{
se−r(t−t0)P(τi ≥ t | τi ≥ t0, θj > t0) + γE
[
e−r(τi−t0)1τi<t | τi ≥ t0, θj > t0
]
− s
}
,
which is equal to W ′(ξi(t0+)). This concludes the proof of Fact 5.
Since the inequality ξi(t0+) > p∗ implies that ξi(t+) > p∗ for all t > t0 close enough to t0,
the next fact is a direct consequence of Fact 5.
Fact 6 Assume that ξi(t0+) > p∗. Then t 7→ γ
i
A(t, σj) is increasing over [t0, t0 + ε], for ε > 0
small enough.
B.2 A priori best-reply properties
In this section, we let σj be an arbitrary strategy of player j, and we let σi be a best reply to
σj . We denote by Si and Sj the supports of σi and σj .
We derive two properties which will help us pinning down the equilibrium set. In Lemmas
1 and 2, we first give a formal content to the intuitive assertion that a player will not drop as
long as his belief exceeds p∗. Since the belief ξi need not be continuous, this will surprisingly
turn out to be somewhat delicate. Next, in Lemma 3, we prove that if there is there is a positive
probability that player j will drop at t0, then it cannot be optimal for player i to drop out just
before t0.
Lemma 1 One has
• ξi(t+) ≤ p∗ for all t ∈ Si.
• ξi(t)(= ξi(t+)) = p∗ for all t ∈ Si \ Sj.
Proof. We start with the first statement. Recall that, by the best-reply property, one has
γiA(t, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj) for σi-a.e. t ∈ Si.
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We argue by contradiction, and assume that ξi(t0+) > p∗ for some t0 ∈ Si. By Fact 6,
there is t¯ > t0 such that γ
i
A(t¯, σj) > γ
i
A(t, σj) for all t ∈ [t0, t¯), hence σi([t0, t¯)) = 0. On
the other hand, since γiA(t0+, σj) ≥ γ
i
A(t0, σj) and since γ
i
A(·, σj) is left-continuous, one also
has γiA(t, σj) < γ
i
A(t¯, σj) for all t ∈ [t, t0], as soon as t < t0 is close enough to t0. Therefore,
σi([t, t0]) = 0, and thus σi([t, t¯)) = 0. But this contradicts the assumption that t0 ∈ Si.
We turn to the second statement. Let I be an open interval containing t, and such that
I ∩ Sj = ∅. In particular, x 7→ γ
i
A(x, σj) is continuous on I. Thus,
γiA(x, σj) ≤ γ
i
A(t, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj),
for each x ∈ I. The result is then a direct consequence of Fact 4.
Lemma 2 Let t0 ∈ R+. If ξi(t0) > p∗, then σi([t0 − ε, t0]) = 0 for each ε > 0 small enough.
Proof. Since ξi is left-continuous, one has ξi(t) > p∗ for all t ∈ [t, t0], as soon as t < t0 is
close enough to t0. By Fact 6, this implies that t 7→ γ
i
A(t, σj) is increasing on the interval [t, t0].
Hence, σi([t, t0)) = 0.
We next discuss two cases. If σj({t0}) = 0, then ξi(t0+) = ξi(t0) > p∗. Using the proof of
Fact 6, the map t 7→ γiA(t, σj) is increasing on the interval [t0, t¯], as soon as t¯ > t0 is close enough
to t0. It follows in that case that σi([t0, t¯)) = 0, as desired.
If instead σj({t0}) > 0, then ξi(·) is discontinuous at t0. Since ξi(t0) is a weighted average
of φ(t0) and of ξi(t0+), one has either φ(t0) > p∗ or ξi(t0+) > p∗. In the former case, one has
W (φ(t0)) > s, and thus γ
i
A(t0+, σj) > γ
i
A(t0, σj), using (14). It follows that σi({t0}) = 0. In the
latter case, by Fact 6 and as in the preceding paragraph, one has σi([t0, t¯)) = 0 for t¯ > t0 close
enough to t0.
We stress that Lemmas 1 and 2 do not rule out the possibility that ξi(t) > p∗ for some t ∈ Si.
Indeed, Lemmas 1 and 2 are consistent with a situation in which ξi(t0) > p∗ ≥ ξi(t0+), and a
strategy σi that assigns probability zero to the interval [t, t0], yet assigns a positive probability
to the interval (t0, t0 + ε), for all ε > 0.
While the conclusion that ξi(t) ≤ p∗ for all t ∈ Si is nevertheless valid, it will only be
established as a corollary to our characterization results, and we do not know of any simple and
direct proof.
Lemma 3 Let t0 ∈ R+ be given. Assume that σj({t0}) > 0. Then σi([t0 − ε, t0]) = 0 for some
ε > 0.
Proof. We handle first a few easy cases. If γiA(t0+, σj) > γ
i
A(t0, σj), then by left-continuity,
one has γiA(t, σj) < γ
i
A(t¯, σj) for all t, t¯ close enough to t0 and such that t ≤ t0 < t¯. The result
follows in that case.
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If now ξi(t0) > p∗, the conclusion follows by Lemma 2.
We are thus left with the case in which ξi(t0) ≤ p∗ and γ
i
A(t0+, σj) = γ
i
A(t0, σj). Using
equation (14), one must haveW (φ(t0)) = s, so that φ(t0) ≤ p∗. By Lemma 1, one has ξi(t0+) ≤ p∗
as well. Since ξi is discontinuous at t0, and since ξi(t0) is a weighted average of ξi(t0+) and of
φ(t0), this implies that ξi(t0) < p∗.
We claim that one must then have
lim sup
tրt0
γiA(t0, σj)− γ
i
A(t, σj)
t0 − t
< 0. (20)
Since γiA(t0, σj) = γ
i
A(t0+, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj), the conclusion will follow.
We rely on equation (12). Since t 7→ W (φ(t)) is a C1 function, with W (φ(t0)) = s, and by
Facts 3 and 3b, the difference between
1
e−rtP(τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t)
×
γiA(t0, σj)− γ
i
A(t, σj)
t0 − t
and
1
t0 − t
{
se−r(t0−t)P(τi ≥ t0 | τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t) + γE
[
e−r(τi−t)1t≤τi<t0 | τi ≥ t, θj ≥ t
]
− s
}
(21)
converges to zero. Observe that the expression in (21) is equal to the incremental payoff over s
(normalized by t0− t) in P when using the policy t0− t, and when starting from a belief of ξi(t).
Since ξi(t0) < p∗, the limit of this expression is therefore negative. This proves (20).
B.3 On non-atomic equilibria
Again, we let a strategy σj of player j be given. We set Fj(t) := σj([0, t]), which is also equal
to P(θj ≤ t | Rj = B). We also introduce Hj(t) :=
∫ t
0
e−λx(1 − Fj(x))dx. In this section, we
prove the next result.
Proposition 5 Let I be an interval in R+ with non-empty interior, such that σj({t}) = 0 for
each t ∈ I. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
• On the interval I, the map t 7→ γiA(t, σ
j) is constant;
• On the interval I, the map Hj is C
2 and is a solution to the linear, second-order differential
equation
W (φ(t))− s
λ(γ − s)
(
H
′′
(t) + λH ′(t)
)
= (φ(t)− p∗)H
′(t) + λφ(t)(ψ(t)− p∗)H(t). (22)
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Proof. We prove that the first statement implies the second one. Fix x ∈ I. For y > x in I,
the equality γiA(x, σj) = γ
i
A(y, σj) writes
0 =
1
y − x
(
s
{
e−r(y−x)P(θj ≥ y, τi ≥ y | min(θj , τi) ≥ x)− 1
}
+E
[
W (φ(θj))e
−r(θj−x)1θj<min(y,τi) | min(θj , τi) ≥ x
]
+γE
[
e−r(τi−x)1τi<min(y,θj) | min(θj , τi) ≥ x
])
.
Taking the limit y ց x in the previous equality, since t 7→ W (φ(t))e−r(t−x) is C1, and by
Facts 1, 2, 3 and 3b, one obtains
0 = −rs+ λξi(x)(γ − s) + (W (φ(x))− s) lim
y→x
P(θj < y | min(θj , τi) ≥ x)
y − x
. (23)
Write N(x, y) := P(τi ≥ x, θj ∈ [x, y)), and D(x) := P(τi ≥ x, θj ≥ x). With these notations,
equation (23) rewrites
(W (φ(x))− s) lim
yցx
N(x, y)
y − x
= rsD(x)− λ(γ − s)P(Ri = Gi,min(τi, θj) ≥ x). (24)
We introduce the function F˜j(t) := P(θj ≤ t | Rj = G), which is related to Fj by the identity
1− F˜j(t) = e
−λt(1− Fj(t)) +
∫ t
0
λe−λz(1− Fj(z))dz.
With these notations at hand, one has
N(x, y) =
(
qGGe
−λx + qGB
)
(F˜j(y)− F˜j(x)) +
(
qGBe
−λx + qBB
)
(Fj(y)− Fj(x)).
Using the relation between F˜j and Fj , and the continuity of Fj , equation (24) implies that Fj is
C1 on the interval I, and therefore, F˜j is C
1 as well, hence Hj is C
2. In addition, F˜ ′j(t) = e
−λtF ′j(t)
for each t ∈ I. It follows that
∂N
∂y
(x, x) = (qGGe
−2λx + 2qGBe
−λx + qBB)F
′
j(x). (25)
On the other hand, D(x) is given by
D(x) = qGGe
−λx(1− F˜j(x)) + qGBe
−λx(1− Fj(x)) + qGB(1− F˜j(x)) + qBB(1− Fj(x)) (26)
while
P(Ri = Gi,min(τi, θj) ≥ x) = qGGe
−λx(1− F˜j(x) + qGBe
−λx(1− Fj(x)). (27)
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When plugging (25), (26) and (27) into (24), when using the relation between F˜j and Fj, and
after obvious algebraic manipulations, one obtains
(W (φ(x))− s)
(
qGGe
−2λx + 2qGBe
−λx + qBB
)
F ′j(x) (28)
= (1− Fj(x))
{
rs
(
qGGe
−2λx + 2qGBe
−λx + qBB
)
− λ(γ − s)(qGGe
−2λx + qGBe
−λx)
}
(29)
+
(∫ x
0
λe−λt(1− Fj(t))dt
)
×
(
rs(qGGe
−λx + qGB)− λ(γ − s)qGGe
−λx
)
. (30)
Observe next that qGGe
−2λx + 2qGBe
−λx + qBB = P(τi ≥ x, τj ≥ x), while
qGGe
−2λx + qGBe
−λx = P(Ri = G, τi ≥ x, τj ≥ x) = φ(x)P(τi ≥ x, τj ≥ x).
On the other hand,
qGGe
−λx
qGGe−λx + qGB
=
P(Ri = G,Rj = G, τi ≥ x)
P(Rj = G, τi ≥ x)
= ψ(x).
Therefore, one has
(W (φ(x))− s)F ′j(x) = (1− Fj(x)) (rs− λ(γ − s)φ(x))
+φ(x)eλx (rs− λ(γ − s)ψ(x))
∫ x
0
λe−λt(1− Fj(t))dt
or equivalently, using p∗ :=
rs
λ(γ−s)
,
W (φ(x))− s
λ(γ − s)
F ′j(x) = (1− Fj(x))(p∗ − φ(x)) + λφ(x)(p∗ − ψ(x))e
λx
∫ x
0
e−λt(1− Fj(t))dt.
Since Hj(x) =
∫ t
0
e−λt(1− Fj(t))dt, it follows that Hj solves the equation
W (φ(x))− s
λ(γ − s)
(
H
′′
j (t) + λH
′
j(t)
)
= (φ(x)− p∗)H
′
j(t) + λφ(x)(ψ(x)− p∗)Hj(t)dt
on the interval I, as desired.
Conversely, if Hj(x) :=
∫ x
0
e−λt(1 − Fj(t)) is a C
2 function and solves (23) on the interval,
then the above computation shows that the map t 7→ γiA(t, σj) is differentiable on I, with a
derivative equal to zero throughout I. It follows that it is a constant map, as desired.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 1 and of Proposition 2
We here specialize to the case ρ > 0. We start with the proof of Proposition 2.
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We let (σ1, σ2) be an equilibrium, and let t0 ∈ Si. Assume for a moment that ξi(t0) > p∗.
Since ρ > 0, this implies that ξi(t+) > p∗ throughout some neighborhood of t0. Hence, by
Fact 6, the map t 7→ γiA(t, σj) is increasing over some neighborhood, which is in contradiction
with t0 ∈ Si. Therefore, ξi(t0) ≤ p∗. Since ρ > 0, this implies φ(t0) ≤ p∗. By Equation (14),
this implies that t 7→ γiA(·, σj) is continuous at t0, so that γ
i
A(t0, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj). In that case,
γiA(t0, σj) = γ
i
A(σi, σj) and ξi(t0) = ξi(t0+).
We next claim that ξi(t0) = p∗. Assume by way of contradiction that ξi(t0) < p∗. We claim
that γiA(t0, σj) < γ
i
A(t, σj), provided t < t0 is close enough to t0. This will yield the desired
contradiction. Since φ(t0) < p∗, the quantity
1
e−rtP(θj ≥ t, τi ≥ t)
×
γiA(t0, σj)− γ
i
A(t, σj)
t− t0
is
equal to
1
t0 − t
{
se−r(t0−t)P(τi ≥ t0, θj ≥ t0 | min(τi, θj) ≥ t)− s
+ sE
[
e−r(θj−t)1t≤θj<min(τi,t0) | min(τi, θj) ≥ t
]
+ γE
[
e−r(τi−t)1t≤τi<min(θj ,t0) | min(τi, θj) ≥ t
]}
.
Since x 7→ e−r(x−t) is C1, and by Facts 1 through 3, this expression has the same limit as
1
t0 − t
{
se−r(t0−t)P(τi ≥ t0 | min(τi, θj) ≥ t) + γE
[
e−r(τi−t)1τi<t0 | min(τi, θj) ≥ t
]
− s
}
.
The latter expression is equal to the difference between the payoff in P induced by the policy
t0 − t, when starting with a belief of ξi(t), and s, divided by t0 − t. Since ξi(t0) < 0, the limit is
therefore negative, as desired.
Therefore, ξi(t0) = p∗. We next prove that σj({t0}) = 0, so that ξi(t0+) = ξi(t) = p∗, as
desired. Assume to the contrary that σj({t0}) > 0. By Lemma 3, one has σi([t0 − ε, t0]) = 0 for
some ε > 0. On the other hand, and since ξi is discontinuous, one has ξi(t0+) > p∗. Using Fact
6, this implies that σi([t0, t0 + ε]) = 0 for ε > 0 small enough. Hence σi assigns probability zero
to some neighborhood of t0. But this is in contradiction with t0 ∈ Si.
B.4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is organized as follows. We first assume the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
and show uniqueness. We next prove existence.
Let (σ, σ) be a symmetric equilibrium, with support S.
Lemma 4 The set S is equal to [Tp, Tψ].
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Proof. Since (σ, σ) is an equilibrium and by Lemma 3, the distribution σ has no atom, and
thus ξ1(·) = ξ2(·) is continuous on S. By Proposition 3, ξ1 = ξ2 is equal to p∗ on S. Finally,
if I is any interval such that σ(I) = 0, then ξi is decreasing on I. This implies that S is an
interval, say [T1, T2]. Since σ([0, T1]) = 0, and σ([0, T2]) = 1, one has respectively ξi(T1) = p(T1)
and ξi(T2) = ψ(T2), hence T1 = Tp, and T2 = Tψ.
Define F (t) := σ([0, t], and set H(t) :=
∫ t
0
e−λx(1 − F (t))dt. By Lemma 4, H(Tp) =∫ Tp
0
e−λtdt =
1− e−λTp
λ
. Since σ has no atom, the payoff function t 7→ γiA(t, σ) is constant
on the interval [Tp, Tψ]. Therefore, by Proposition 5, H is C
2 on the interval [Tp, Tψ] and solves
the equation (22) on that interval. Since ρ > 0, one has φ(t) < p∗, and therefore W (φ(t)) = s,
for each t ∈ [Tp, Tψ]. Hence the equation (22) boils down to the first-order equation
H ′(x) =
λφ(x)(ψ(x)− p∗)
p∗ − φ(x)
H(x). (31)
This equation has a unique solution such that H(Tp) =
1− e−λTp
λ
. This shows that a symmetric
equilibrium, if it exists, must be unique.
Conversely, consider the (unique) solution H to the equation (31) on the interval [Tp, Tψ], that
satisfies the initial condition H(Tp) =
1− e−λTp
λ
, and observe that H is smooth on the interval
[Tp, Tψ]. Set F (t) = 1− e
λtH ′(t) for each t ∈ [Tp, Tψ]. We now prove that F is the cumulative of
some mixed strategy, which forms a symmetric equilibrium.
Observe first that, using (31) and the boundary condition, one has F (Tp) = 0, and F (Tψ) = 1.
It can be checked that the derivative of F is of the sign of ρ on the interval [Tp, Tψ], so that F is
increasing.21
Let σ be the probability distribution defined by σ([0, t]) = F (t). Note that σ has no atom.
When facing the strategy σ, the belief of player i solves ξi(t) = P(Ri = G | τi ≥ t) > p∗ for
t < Tp, and ξi(t) = ψ(t) < p∗ for t > Tψ. Hence any best-reply of player i to σ assigns probability
1 to [Tp, Tψ]. By Proposition 5, the map t 7→ γ
i
A(t, σ) is constant on [Tp, Tψ]. Hence, any strategy
that assigns probability 1 to [Tp, Tψ] is a best-reply to σ. Therefore, (σ, σ) is an equilibrium.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We assume here that the two arms are negatively correlated, ρ < 0. We prove that the
game has a unique equilibrium, which happens to be symmetric. We first prove uniqueness, then
existence, of an equilibrium.
21Details of the computation are available upon request.
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Thus, assume first that the game has an equilibrium, say (σ1, σ2). Note that since ρ < 0, the
belief ξi(·) is decreasing on R+. We denote by Si the support of the distribution σi.
Lemma 5 One has S1 = S2 = [Tp, Tˆ ], for some Tˆ such that Tp < Tˆ < Tφf.
Proof. We first argue by way of contradiction that S1 = S2, and thus assume that there
exists t0 ∈ S1 \ S2. By Lemma 1, one has ξi(t0) = p∗. By Fact 6, and since ξ1 is decreasing, one
has t0 = minS1. Hence, ξ2 is simply equal to P(R2 = G | τ2 ≥ t) for t < t0. This implies that
ξ2(t) ≥ ξ1(t), and thus, ξ2(t) > p∗, for each t < t0. By Fact 6, one must then have t0 < minS2.
Set t := inf{t > t0 : t ∈ S1 ∪ S2}. Observe that ξ1(t) < p∗ for each t ∈ (t0,minS2), hence
t /∈ S1 by Lemma 1. This implies that t = minS2. We claim that t belongs to S1 as well. If
instead t /∈ S1. then ξ2(t) = p∗ by Lemma 1. On the other hand, and since t = minS2, one has
ξ1(t) ≥ ξ2(t) for t ≤ t, which yields ξ2(t) < p∗ since ξ1(t) < p∗ for each t > t0 – a contradiction,
and thus t ∈ S1 ∩ S2, as claimed. Note that we have proven as well that ξi(t) < p∗ for i = 1, 2.
By Lemma 3, at least one of the two strategies σ1, σ2 does not have an atom at t. Fix
i ∈ {1, 2} such that σi({t}) = 0. Then, γ
j
A(·, σi) is continuous at t, so that γ
j
A(t, σi) = γ
j
A(σi, σj).
By Fact 4, the map t 7→ γiA(t, σj) is decreasing over the interval [t0, t]. This is in contradiction
with the equality γjA(t, σi) = γ
j
A(σi, σj). This concludes the proof that S1 = S2.
We next prove, again by way of contradiction, that the common set S1 = S2 is an interval.
Assume instead that there are two dates t < t¯ in S, such that (t, t¯) ∩ S = ∅.
Wlog, using Lemma 3, assume that σ2({t}) = 0, so that γ
2
A(t, σ1) = γ
2
A(σ1, σ2). Since t ∈ S,
one has σ1({t}) = σ2({t}) = 0,
22 one has ξ2(t) ≤ p∗. By Fact 4 again, this implies that the map
t 7→ γ2A(t, σ
1) is decreasing over the interval (t, t¯] – a contradiction.
By Lemma 3, none of the two distributions σ1 and σ2 can possibly have an atom in (Tp, Tˆ ],
and at most one of the two distributions has an atom at Tp. Assume that, say, that σ1 has no
atom. We denote by F1 the cdf of σ1, and introduce H1(t) =
∫ t
0
e−λx(1− F1(x))dx. Since σ1 is
non-atomic, the map t 7→ γ2A(t, σ1) is constant on the interval [Tp, Tˆ ]. By Proposition 5, H1 is C
2
on the interval [Tp, Tˆ ], and solves the linear equation (22) on this interval. Since W (φ(t)) > s on
the interval [Tp, Tφ), the coefficient of H
′′
1 does not vanish on this interval, and there is a unique
solution to (22) on the interval [Tp, Tφ) that assumes given initial values for H1(Tp) and H
′
1(Tp).
On the other hand, note that H1 satisfies the boundary condition H1(Tp) =
1−e−λTp
λ
, H ′1(Tp) =
e−λTp . Hence, H1, and therefore F1 is uniquely defined. This in turn defines uniquely Tˆ as the
smallest t such that F1(t) = 1.
22Otherwise, by Lemma 3, and since S1 = S2, t would be a common atom of σ1 and of σ2 – contradicting
Lemma 3.
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We next proceed to show that σ1 = σ2. We denote by F2 the cdf of σ2, and introduce the
map H2(t) :=
∫ t
0
e−λx(1 − F2(x))dx, for t > Tp. We argue by contradiction and assume that
F2(Tp) > 0(= F1(Tp)). Since σ2 has no atom in (Tp, Tˆ ], one has γ
1
A(t, σ2) = γ
1
A(σ1, σ2) for each
t ∈ (Tp, Tˆ ], and therefore, H2 solves (22) on the interval (Tp, Tˆ ]. In addition, when setting
H2(Tp) :=
1− e−λTp
λ
and H ′2(Tp) = e
−λTp(1 − F2(Tp)), the map H2 is C
2 on the closed interval
[Tp, Tˆ ] and solves (22) on [Tp, Tˆ ].
We set Ω(t) := (1 − F1(t))H2(t) − (1 − F2(t))H1(t). Note that Ω(Tp) > 0, while Ω(Tˆ ) = 0
since F1(Tˆ ) = F2(Tˆ ) = 1.
Set T := min{t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ] : Ω(t) = 0}. Since Ω(Tˆ ) = 0, one has T ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ] and Ω(T ) = 0.
Since Ω(Tp) > 0, one has Ω(t) > 0 for each t ∈ [Tp, T ). From (22), one has
F ′i (t)
Hi(t)
= λφ(x)(p∗ − ψ(x)) + (p∗ − φ(x))
H ′i(x)
Hi(x)
,
for t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ]. Hence, for fixed t, the ratio
F ′i (t)
Hi(t)
is decreasing w.r.t. the ratio
1− Fi(t)
Hi(t)
. Since
Ω(t) > 0 for t ∈ [Tp, T ), it follows that
F ′1(t)
H1(t)
<
F ′2(t)
H2(t)
for t ∈ [Tp, T ), and therefore, Ω(·) is
increasing over the interval [Tp, Tˆ ]. This contradicts the fact that Ω(Tp) > Ω(Tˆ ). This concludes
the proof that there is at most one equilibrium.
We now turn to existence. Since W (φ(x)) > s for x ∈ [Tp, Tφ), there is a C
2 function H that
solves (22) on the interval [Tp, Tφ) and such that H(Tp) =
1− e−λTp
λ
and H ′(Tp) = e
−λTp .
Lemma 6 Let T ∈ [Tp, Tφ) be such that H
′(t) > 0 on [Tp, T ]. Then H
′′
(t)+λH ′(t) ≤ 0 for each
t ∈ [Tp, T ].
In particular, H ′ is decreasing over [Tp, T ].
Proof. Set T1 := max{t ∈ [Tp, T ] : H
′′
(t) + λH ′(t) ≤ 0}. From (22), one can check that
H
′′
(Tp) + λH
′(Tp) < 0, hence T1 > Tp. We claim that T1 = T . Assume to the contrary that
T1 < T . One has H
′′
(t) ≤ −λH ′(t) < 0 for each tin[Tp, T ], hence H
′ is decreasing on [Tp, T1],
and H
′′
(T1) < . Hence there exists T ‘ ∈ (T1, T ] such that H
′ is decreasing on [T1, T
′].
We rewrite equation (22) as
α(t)(H
′′
(t) + λH ′(t)) = a(t)H ′(t) + b(t)H(t),
with a(t) := eλt (rsP(min(τ1, τ2) ≥ t)− λ(γ − s)P(R
i = G, τj ≥ t)), b(t) := λe
λt (rsP(Ri = G, τj ≥ t)−
and α(t) > 0 for each t ∈ [Tp, Tφ]. It can be shown that a(·) is positive and decreasing, while b(·)
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is negative and decreasing on [Tp, T
′]. On the other hand, H ′ is positive and decreasing, while
H is positive and increasing on [Tp, T
′].
Therefore,
a(t)H ′(t) + b(t)H(t) < a(Tp)H
′(Tp) + b(Tp)H(Tp) (32)
for each t ∈ (Tp, T
′], and an easy computation shows that the right-hand side of (32) is equal to
zero. Hence H
′′
+ λH ′ is negative on [T1, T
′] – in contradiction with the definition of T1.
Lemma 7 There exists t < Tφ such that H
′(t) = 0.
Proof. Assume instead that H ′(t) > 0 for each t ∈ [Tp, Tφ). Integrating (22), there are
c1, c2 ∈ R, such that
H ′(t) + λH(t) = c1 + c2
∫ t
Tp
φ(x)− p∗
W (φ(x))− s
H ′(x)dx+ λ
∫ t
Tp
φ(x)(ψ(x)− p∗)
W (φ(x))− s
H(x)dx. (33)
By Lemma 6, H ′ is decreasing and positive on [Tp, Tφ], and is therefore bounded. Note also that
H is positive, increasing and bounded.
Since the map x 7→ W (φ(x))− s is C1 and vanishes for t = Tφ, the first integral in (33) has
a finite limit when t→ Tφ, while the second one converges to −∞, which implies H
′(t)→ −∞,
a contradiction.
Define Tˆ := min{t ∈ [Tp, Tφ] : H
′(t) = 0}. Define F by F (t) = 0 for t ≤ Tp, F (t) = 1−e
λtH ′(t)
for t ∈ [Tp, Tˆ ], and F (t) = 1 for t > Tˆ ]. The map F is increasing on [Tp, Tˆ ] by Lemma 6, and is
continuous over R+. It is therefore the cdf of a non-atomic measure σ, which is concentrated on
[Tp, Tˆ ]. We now argue that (σ, σ) is a symmetric equilibrium.
Since σ is non-atomic, the map t 7→ γiA(t, σ) is continuous over the compact set R+ ∪ {+∞},
and a best-reply therefore exists. When facing σ, one has ξi(t) > p∗ for t < Tp, and ξi(t) < p∗ for
t > Tˆ , hence the support of any best-reply map is included in [Tp, Tˆ ]. By Proposition 5, the map
t 7→ γiA(t, σ) is constant on [Tp, Tˆ ], and thus, any strategy with support in [Tp, Tˆ ] is a best-reply
to σ.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 may be the more delicate, and we will remain on the informal
side, to save much on notation.23 We let K ∈ N be given, and will prove the existence of an
equilibrium with a support of cardinal K. Set Ω := {(u1, v1, . . . , uK, vK) ∈ R
2K such that Tp =
u1 ≤ v1 ≤ · · · ≤ uK ≤ Tψ}. We will focus on strategies with a finite support S. Rather than
23Formal details are available from the authors.
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viewing such a strategy σ as a probability distribution over S, we equivalently describe it by the
conditional probability of dropping at t, σ({t})/σ([0, t)).
Given ω ∈ Ω, we define S1(ω) = {u1, . . . , uK} and S2(ω) = {v1, . . . , vK}.
Given ω ∈ Ω, we define inductively x1(ω), . . . , xK−1(ω) as follows. We set x1(ω) = 0 if
v1 = u1(= Tp). If v1 > u1, we define x1(ω) ∈ [0, 1] by the requirement that, if the strategy σ1 of
player has a support in S1(ω) and drops with probability x1(ω) at u1, then the belief ξ2(v1) held
by player 2 at v1 is equal to p∗. Similarly, xk(ω) is set to 0 if vk = uk, and otherwise defined by
the condition that ξ2(vk) = p∗, if σ1 has a support in S1(ω) and drops with probability xl(ω) at
time ul (l ≤ k).
Somewhat symmetrically, the values yl(ω) (l = 1, . . . , K − 1) are defined inductively in such
a way that the belief ξ1(uk) (k > 1) held by player 1 is equal to p∗ if σ2 drops with probability
yl(ω) at dates vl, l = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Whether or not all dates in ω are distinct, one then has ξ1(uk) = ξ2(vk) = p∗, for each
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. In addition, xk(ω) and yk(ω) lie in [0, 1] and are continuous in ω.
We introduce some additional piece of notation. Given ω ∈ Ω, and u˜k ∈ [vk−1, vk], we denote
by ω|u˜k the point in Ω obtained when substituting u˜k to uk.
We next proceed by defining a continuous map from Ω into itself. It will be obtained as the
composition of several maps αk(ω) (k > 1) and βk(ω) (k < K).
We start with αk(ω). Let ω ∈ Ω be given. If vk = vk−1, we set αk(ω) = vk. If instead
vk > vk−1, and for any u˜k ∈ (vk−1, vk), we denote by ∆
2
k(u˜k) the difference in player 2’s expected
payoffs induced by the strategies vk−1 and vk, when facing the strategy of player 1 which drops
out with probability xl(ω|u˜k) at time u1, . . . , uk−1, u˜k, . . .. We claim that ∆
2
k(·) is decreasing over
the open interval (vk−1, vk). To see this, let uk < u¯k be given in (vk−1, vk). We denote by σ
uk
1
and σu¯k1 the corresponding two strategies of player 1.
Using the strategy vk rather than vk−1 , when facing either σ
uk
1 or σ
u¯k
1 , may yield a different
outcome only if min(τ2, θ1) ≥ vk−1, and we henceforth assume that this event holds. The contin-
uation payoff is then equal to s when using vk−1. We will prove that the continuation payoff of
strategy vk is higher when facing σ
uk
1 than when facing σ
u¯k
1 . We proceed in several steps.
Note first that to ensure a belief of p∗ at time vk, it must be that xk(ω|uk) > xk(ω|u¯k). Next,
everything else being kept constant, the expected payoff of player 2 (induced by the strategy vk)
is linear in the probability that player 1 drops out at uk (or at u¯k). In addition, the higher this
probability, the more informative if player 1’s decision at time uk, and therefore, the higher this
payoff.
This implies that it will be sufficient to prove the following statement. (Conditional on
τ2 > vk−1, θ1 > vk−1), the expected payoff induced by the strategy vk is higher when facing a
strategy that stops with probability one at uk (in the absence of payoffs) than when facing a
strategy that stops with probability one at u¯k.
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Note that the outcomes induced by these two profiles are identical, as soon as either τ1 < uk
or τ2 < uk. Hence, we may and will condition on the event min(τ1, τ2) ≥ uk. In that event, the
continuation payoff induced by the first profile as of time uk is equal to s, since player 2 drops
out at uk, immediately following player 1. On the other hand, under the second profile, player
2 will either drop out at u¯k if τ1, τ2 ≥ u¯k, or remain active then, possibly forever. If u¯k differs
from uk by an infinitesimal amount of time, and using the same arguments as in earlier proofs,
this expected payoff is approximately equal to
s+ φ(t)× λdt× (γ − s) + φ(t)× λdt× (W (ψ(t))− s)− rsdt.
Using the fact that uk ≥ Tp, so that p(t) ≤ p∗, it is not difficult to show that this payoff does not
exceed s, at least when ρ is sufficiently close to one, and the outside option s is close enough to
zero.
This concludes the proof that ∆2k is decreasing wrt u˜k. Continuity of ∆
2
k on the open interval
(vk−1, vk) is easy to check. Finally, observe that, on the one hand, ∆
2
k(·) > 0 when u˜k is very
close to vk−1 (the proof follows that of Fact 1), while ∆
2
k(·) < 0 when u˜k is very close to vk. The
reason there is that in the limit u˜k → vk, player 2 will drop out at time vk iff τ2 ≥ vk. Hence
there is a unique value, uˆk, such that ∆
2
k(uˆk) = 0, and we set αk(ω) = (ω|uˆk).
The definition of βk(ω) slightly differs, to reflect the disymmetry between the two players.
Let ω ∈ Ω be given. If uk = uk+1, we set βk(ω) = uk. Otherwise, we set βk(ω) = (ω|vˆk), where
vˆk ∈ (uk, uk+1) is the unique point such that the expected payoffs induced by the two strategies uk
and uk+1 against the strategy that drops out with probability yl(ω|vˆk) at time v1, . . . , vk−1, vˆk, . . ..
The map αK ◦ βK ◦ · · · ◦ α1 ◦ β1 maps continuously Ω into itself, hence has a fixed point,
ω∗ = (u
∗
1, v
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
K , v
∗
K). It follows by construction that Tp = u
∗
1 < v
∗
1 < · · ·u
∗
K < v
∗
K = Tψ,
and that equilibrium requirements are met by the strategies that drop out respectively with
probability xl(ω∗) at time u
∗
l , and with probability yl(ω∗) at time v
∗
l .
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